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ABSTRACT
Suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover damages for
"excessive force" bear some resemblance to common law tort litigation,
since the key issue is whether the force used was "unreasonable." In
ordinary negligence law the jury typically decides whether an actor has
exercised reasonable care, even when there is no dispute as to the facts.
In § 1983 litigation the federal courts are badly split on the allocation
of decision making between judge and jury, sometimes even within a
particular circuit. The Supreme Court recently faced the judge-jury
issue in Scott v. Harris, where it ruled that a police officer acts
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reasonably when he rams a suspect's car in order to end a high-speed
chase. But the Court did not explain why it preferred judicial over jury
decision making on the issue, nor did it even identify the choice
between judge and jury as an issue requiring attention. This article
argues that, whatever the merit of the substantive holding of Scott, the
Court was right to favor judge over jury in this context. The key
difference between constitutional torts and common law torts is that the
defendant in a § 1983 suit can win even if he has violated the plaintiff's
constitutional rights. This is because the defendant enjoys official
immunity from liability for damages so long as the plaintiffs rights
were not "clearly established" at the time the defendant acted.
Consequently, because juries cannot lay down rules, a regime in which
they decide Fourth Amendment reasonableness on a case-by-case basis
will systematically thwart plaintiffs' efforts to recover damages. The
aims of § 1983-to deter constitutional violations and vindicate
constitutional rights-would be better served by a body of law that
consists of bright-line rules, which can only be made by judges.
I. INTRODUCTION
Scott v. HarrisI will be remembered as the case in which the
Supreme Court entered the YouTube age by citing a videotape available
on YouTube's website of the high-speed police chase that gave rise to
the litigation.2 But the long-run significance of the case lies elsewhere:
in the Court's allocation of decision-making responsibilities between
judge and jury in suits seeking damages for constitutional violations.
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia. The author wishes to thank Bobby
Bartlett, Dan Coenen, Tom Eaton, and Jason Solomon for helpful comments on a
draft.
1. 550 U.S. 372 (2007); see Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald
Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v, Harris and the Perils of
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 838 (2009) (further discussing Scott v.
Harris); Karen M. Blum, Scott v. Harris: Death Knellfor Deadly Force Policies and
Garner Jury Instructions?, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 45, 52-53 (2007) (further discussing
Scott v. Harris); Leading Cases, The Supreme Court, 2006 Term, 121 HARV. L. REV.
185, 214 (2007) (further discussing Scott v. Harris).
2. 550 U.S. at 378 n.5. Professor Blum has gathered cases suggesting that "[i]n
the wake of Scott, other courts are now relying on video evidence to relate what
'really' happened." Blum, supra note, at 53 n.47.
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Scott held that a police officer committed no Fourth Amendment
violation when he rammed Harris's vehicle to end the pursuit, even
though Harris was suspected of nothing more serious than a speeding
violation.3 Severely injured when his car left the road, Harris sued
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Scott had used excessive force,
thereby violating the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
"unreasonable... seizure." 4 The district court and an Eleventh Circuit
panel had ruled that Harris was entitled to a jury trial on the issue of
whether the force used was reasonable. 5 After viewing videos produced
by cameras mounted on police cars, the Court ordered that Scott be
granted the directed verdict he sought.6  Only Justice Stevens
dissented.7
Justice Scalia's majority opinion lacks clarity as to why the
8directed verdict should have been granted. Some of his reasoning
suggests that the result turns on the narrow issue of whether a
reasonable jury could have found for Harris in light of the video.
According to the Court, Harris's "version of events [was] so utterly
discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed
him." 9 In other parts of the opinion, however, the Court seems to rely
upon a more ambitious rationale-one that assigns the task of applying
law to fact in determining Fourth Amendment reasonableness to judge
rather than to juries. For example, Justice Scalia declares that "in
judging whether Scott's actions were reasonable, we must consider" a
variety of factors.' 0 Although this broader principle better accounts for
the outcome, 1 the Court does not articulate or defend it, and the judge-
3. 550 U.S. at 374-76.
4. Id. at 374, 386.
5. Id. at 375-76.
6. Id. at 378-79, 386.
7. ld. at 389.
8. Id. at 380-81.
9. Id. at 380.
10. Id. at 383 (emphasis added).
11. Despite the lack of clarity in the opinion, commentators seem to agree that
the ruling as to the video was only one step toward the holding. See Blum, supra note
, at 53 ("Once the Court decided that the videotape was incontrovertible evidence that
Harris presented a threat to others on the road, the question remained as to whether
Scott's use of force to eliminate the threat was objectively reasonable."); Leading
Cases, supra note , at 218 ("Having determined the appropriate treatment of the
contested facts, the Court turned to whether Scott's use of force was objectively
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
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jury issue remains an open one.
Using Scott as a starting point, this article examines the proper
roles of judge and jury in § 1983 litigation over claims that police
officers have used excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable seizures. This general topic
raises two distinct questions, only one of which is discussed in this
article. One set of judge-jury issues involves the Seventh
Amendment,' 2 which seems to require 3 that questions of historical
fact-regarding who did what-are for the jury. 14 The harder question,
and the one addressed here, is one of judicial policy making. It
concerns which decision maker should apply Fourth Amendment norms
12. The Seventh Amendment applies to § 1983 litigation. See City of Monterey
v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 709 (1999) ("We hold that a
§ 1983 suit seeking legal relief is an action at law within the meaning of the Seventh
Amendment."). The Court also held that "the statute itself does not confer the jury
right." Id. at 707.
13. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996)
(concluding that matters of "simple historical fact" are for the jury). In Scott, the
Court took for itself the issue of how Fourth Amendment principles should be applied
to the historical facts. See 550 U.S. at 381-85 (evaluating the reasonableness of
Scott's conduct). One might argue that the Seventh Amendment covers this issue, for
Markman had recognized the existence of a range of matters that fall "somewhere
between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact," some of which call for
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. 517 U.S. at 388. But none of the Justices,
including Justice Stevens in his dissent, identified a Seventh Amendment issue in
Scott.
14. It is not altogether clear whether this must be so in all contexts as a matter of
constitutional law. It is in any event the settled practice in § 1983 excessive-force
litigation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Dist. of Columbia, 528 F.3d 969,977 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(stating summary judgment was premature because "whether Johnson's prone position
was threatening or suggested escape" is a "dispute that can only be resolved by
evaluating the conflicting testimony of Johnson and Bruce"); Moore v. Indehar, 514
F.3d 756, 762 (8th Cir. 2008) ("Where questions of historical fact exist, the jury must
resolve those questions so that the court may make the ultimate legal determination of
whether officers' actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established
law." (quoting Littrell v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 586 (8th Cir. 2004))); Meadours v.
Ermel, 483 F.3d 417, 423 (5th Cir. 2007) (ruling that a trial was required to resolve
"several key factual disputes ... for example, whether Meadours was first shot while
charging at Officer Kominek or while he was still atop the doghouse, posing no
imminent threat"); Winterrowd v. Nelson, 480 F.3d 1181, 1183 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007)
("A jury will have to resolve the conflicting versions as to what transpired after the
stop."); Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 392 (2d Cir. 2005) ("credibility-
weighings" are for the jury); Bell v. Irwin, 321 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2003) ("When
material facts are in dispute, then the case must go to a jury.").
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to the historical facts once those facts are determined.15 Like the
Supreme Court in Scott, lower courts seldom give careful attention to
this question. Scholars, too, have glossed over the problem. This
inattentiveness is both perplexing and disturbing, because the allocation
of decisional roles arises frequently in § 1983 cases.
Though the reported opinions often are opaque on this issue,
they can be roughly divided into two camps. Some courts seem to
follow the common law of torts, assigning the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness issue to the jury.16 Other courts allocate the task of
determining "reasonableness" to themselves, at least when the case
presents no disputed issues of historical fact. 17 Not one of the opinions,
15. See HENRY M. HART, JR., & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 350-51 (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (giving a classic account of the "three-fold nature
of the decisional process," distinguishing between "fact identification," "law
declaration," and "law application").
16. See, e.g., Parker v. Gerrish, 547 F.3d 1, 8-11 (1st Cir. 2008) (upholdingjury
verdict for plaintiff on excessive force); Gill v. Maciejewski, 546 F.3d 557, 562 (8th
Cir. 2008) (upholding jury verdict for plaintiff on excessive force); Chelios v.
Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 689 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that when the facts are viewed
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, "a jury reasonably could find that the force
that Sergeant Heavener and the two other officers used in arresting Mr. Chelios was
unreasonable"); Curley v. Klein, 499 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that
question of whether an officer's mistake in firing his weapon was "essentially factual"
and for the jury); Jennings v. Jones, 479 F.3d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 2007) (reviewing a
jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff on excessive force and reversing the district
court's grant of qualified immunity to the defendant); Baker v. City of Hamilton, 471
F.3d 601,607 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that on the plaintiffs facts, "a reasonable jury
could conclude that Officer Taylor's strike to Baker's head was unjustified and
excessive"); Parks v. Pomeroy, 387 F.3d 949, 955-56 (8th Cir. 2004) ("[W]hether
Pomeroy used objectively unreasonable force when he fatally shot Parks is a question
of fact."); Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 399 (5th Cir. 2004) (rejecting
summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that issues of fact remained to be
determined, and characterizing "whether [the officer] reasonably believed that Flores
posed a significant threat" as a question of fact).
17. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Knoulton, 542 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he
ultimate determination of Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness is a question of
law." (quoting White v. Balderama, 153 F.3d 237, 241 (5th Cir. 1998))); Davenportv.
Causey, 521 F.3d 544, 550-54 (6th Cir. 2008) (examining the evidence and holding
that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment because "the facts, even when
viewed most favorably to the plaintiffs, do not constitute a constitutional violation");
Moore v. Indehar, 514 F.3d 756, 762 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding questions of historical
fact are for the jury, but the court makes the determination of whether the officers'
actions were objectively reasonable); Long v. Slaton, 508 F.3d 576, 580-81 (11 th Cir.
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however, acknowledges that there is an important and highly
contestable policy question at stake in these cases. Not one opinion
deliberately reasons its way to a principled explanation of why the court
2007) ("Accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, we conclude that
Deputy Slaton's force was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.");
Bell v. Irwin, 321 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Permitting the jury freedom to
determine for itself whether particular conduct was reasonable within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment would introduce the ex post reassessment that Graham
decried."); Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1279-85 (9th Cir. 2001) (examining
the excessive-force issue in detail and concluding that "the force was excessive
compared to the governmental interests at stake").
Sometimes courts take the task for themselves without explicitly acknowledging
that they are making a choice between judge and jury. In Davis v. City ofLas Vegas,
the court said that in order to resolve the excessive-force issue for purposes of
summary judgment:
We start... by assessing the quantum of force used against Davis....
Next, we must assess the governmental interest that might justify the use
of such force ....
Second, we assess whether the suspect posed an immediate threat ....
Next we consider whether Davis was actively resisting arrest ....
Finally, we consider whether Miller could have used other methods ....
478 F.3d 1048, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added). The court concluded that the plaintiffs facts "demonstrate that Officer
Miller's actions were unreasonable and that Davis's Fourth Amendment rights were
violated." Id. at 1056; see also Estate of Larsen ex rel. Sturdivan v. Murr, 511 F.3d
1255, 1260 (10th Cir. 2008) ("We assess objective reasonableness ...... (emphasis
added)).
Other opinions leave it unclear whether reasonableness will be decided by judge
or jury. See Meadours v. Ermel, 483 F.3d 417,423 (5th Cir. 2007) (giving somewhat
confusing signals as to whether the Fourth Amendment reasonableness issue was for
the court or the jury). In Meadours, the court stated that in order to resolve that issue,
"we must balance the amount of force used against the need for force." Id. at 423
(emphasis added). But then it said that "[w]e express no opinion about the ultimate
reasonableness of the officers' actions. It is for a jury to decide the factual disputes,
and at this stage we cannot say the officers are entitled to qualified immunity." Id. at
424. It is hard to be certain just where the Meadours court means to put the
responsibility for deciding reasonableness. For an earlier 5th Circuit case that seems
to rest on the implicit premise that the issue is for the court, see Ballard v. Burton, 444
F.3d 391, 402-03 (5th Cir. 2006) (taking the plaintiff's historical facts as given, the
court addressed and resolved the Fourth Amendment reasonableness issue for the
defendant). Ramirez does not cite either Meadours or Ballard, but relies instead on a
case decided before either of them. See 542 F.3d at 128 (citing Balderama, 153 F.3d
at 241).
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should allocate decision-making responsibility in favor ofjudge or jury.
And not one decision even begins to sketch the arguments that cut
against the decision the court has reached. As a result, there appear to
be not merely disagreements among circuits but intra-circuit conflicts
on this question.1 8 It is impossible to know for sure, however, because
courts typically do not even flag the judge-jury allocation issue or
explain why they have resolved that issue one way rather than the other.
Nor is it always clear whether a court is squarely ruling on the merits of
the excessive force issue or on the reasonableness of a potential jury
finding for one party or the other.' 
9
My thesis is that in § 1983 litigation, judges should be favored
over juries in deciding matters, such as Fourth Amendment
reasonableness, that require the application of law to fact.2 ° Judges
should be favored because the substantive constitutional law in this area
should be stated in the form of rules, and only judges can make rules.
The core of my argument is that the judge-jury issue cannot be resolved
21in a vacuum. It must take account of the official immunity doctrine,
18. Compare Flores, 381 F.3d at 399 (5th Cir.), Baker, 471 F.3d at 607 (6th
Cir.), Chelios, 520 F.3d at 689 (7th Cir.), and Parks, 387 F.3d at 955-56 (8th Cir.)
with Ramirez, 542 F.3d at 124 (5th Cir.), Davenport, 521 F.3d at 550-54 (6th Cir.),
Bell, 321 F.3d at 640 (7th Cir.), and Moore, 514 F.3d at 762 (8th Cir.).
19. See, e.g., Davenport v. Causey, 521 F.3d at 546 (noting that the officer,
Causey, stopped Davenport for a traffic violation at 7:58:43 A.M.; Davenport
disobeyed his commands, and at 7:59:51 A.M., Causey shot and killed Davenport).
The Court's holding in favor of the defendant may be a ruling of the kind a court
might make in ordinary negligence law, that (a) the issue is for the jury, and (b) ajury
could not reasonably find for the plaintiff on these facts.
A more plausible reading of the case is that the court addresses the constitutional
issue directly and rules that the officers acted reasonably. See id. at 552 (stating
"judges are to look" at various factors) (emphasis added). One cannot be certain of
this, however, because the court does not explicitly indicate just what it is doing.
20. The "unreasonable seizure" judge-jury issue is one aspect of a much larger
debate. The judge-jury issue comes up across the whole range of topics covered by
American law, and its resolution may vary depending on the substantive context in
which it arises. See Mark P. Gergen, The Jury's Role in Deciding Normative Issues in
the American Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 407, 409 (1999) (discussing the
judge-jury issue and its substantive contexts).
21. As Daryl Levinson points out in his critique of "rights essentialism," one
cannot think straight about constitutional rights without taking account of remedial
considerations: "Rights are dependent on remedies not just for their application to the
real world, but for their scope, shape, and very existence." Daryl J. Levinson, Rights
Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 857, 858 (1999).
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which protects police officers from liability unless they have violated
"clearly established ... rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." 22 The aims of § 1983-vindicating constitutional rights and
deterring constitutional violations 23-are now and will continue to be
systematically frustrated by the official immunity doctrine unless courts
strive to state substantive constitutional "excessive force" law in the
form of black letter rules. For this reason, I argue that the normatively
superior reading of Scott is the judge-over-jury alternative. Objections
to this reading that champions of the jury might advance are, on
balance, unavailing.
I defend this thesis in five Parts. Part I examines and rejects the
notion that Fourth Amendment values are adequately served by
transplanting jury-friendly common law principles into the law of
constitutional torts. I argue that the seeming analogy between
constitutional torts and common law torts is weak because the
differences between the two areas override similarities. Part II
discusses the distinctive policy issues raised by the judge-jury question
in § 1983 litigation and urges that a heightened need for rule-oriented
doctrine in this area favors a decision-making scheme that assigns more
authority to judges than to juries. Part HI examines the extensive body
of lower court opinions in excessive force cases and suggests that
modem courts have moved in the direction advocated here, by giving
judicially enforceable content to the Fourth Amendment's commands.
Part IV considers the impact of Scott on the future of this movement.
Part V addresses objections to my thesis likely to come from
22. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see infra Part III.B.2. This
article takes the current law of qualified immunity as a given and argues for stating
substantive constitutional law in the form of rules as a means of coping with this
obstacle to recovery. Another alternative is to replace Harlow with a more rule-
oriented approach to immunity. See Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified
Immunity in the Age of Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261,332-33
(1995) ("[S]ome form of immunity rules would be preferable to the current,
unqualified immunity standard").
23. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-54 (1980)
(discussing compensation and deterrence); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253-56
(1978) (same). The Court's references to "compensation" are best understood as
shorthand for vindication of rights, for the Court's doctrine is not designed to assure
that constitutional wrongs will always be compensated. They may nonetheless be
adequately vindicated. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional
Torts: Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 84-96 (1989)
(discussing rationales for compensation).
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proponents of open-ended constitutional balancing tests that tend to
channel decision making to juries.
]I. SECTION 1983 AND THE COMMON LAW
Section 1983 authorizes a cause of action against any person
who, "under color of' state law, violates the plaintiffs constitutional
rights. Harris's § 1983 suit against Scott rested on a well-settled
doctrinal framework: (1) An "unreasonable. . . seizure" violates the
Fourth Amendment; 24 (2) a "seizure" occurs when there is a
"governmental termination of movement through means intentionally
applied"25; (3) ramming a car to stop it amounts to a "seizure"; 26 and (4)
a seizure is "unreasonable" when a police officer uses "excessive force"
in bringing it about. 27 In this case and others like it, the key issue is
whether the force was reasonable or excessive. 28  The principal
24. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) ("Where ... the excessive
force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is
most properly characterized as one involving the protections of the Fourth
Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right 'to be secure in their
persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures' of the person.")
At some point after the initial arrest, the interaction between the officer and the
person seized will be governed by Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
rather than the Fourth Amendment. See Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 446 (4th
Cir. 2008) (holding when the excessive force occurs after the arrest, while the plaintiff
is being transported to jail for booking, the Fourteenth Amendment test applies, and
the plaintiff must show that the officer "inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and
suffering" (quoting Taylor v. McDuffie, 155 F.3d 479, 483 (4th Cir. 1998))). The
Supreme Court has not yet specified exactly what line should be drawn. My focus in
this article is solely on Fourth Amendment claims.
25. Brower v. Inyo County, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (emphasis omitted).
26. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (deriving the principle that
ramming a car to stop it amounts to a "seizure" from the Court's reasoning in Brower,
489 U.S. at 597).
27. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394.
28. This article deals primarily with the judge-jury issues that arise in excessive-
force cases. Note that an encounter with the police may give rise to other
constitutional claims, including: (a) whether an officer at the scene, who fails to
intervene to protect the victim from the force, may be held liable, see, e.g., Hadley v.
Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding officer entitled to
qualified immunity because no evidence presented at trial that he could have
prevented excessive force); (b) whether the officer had sufficient grounds to justify
any seizure, even one that does not involve the use of force, see, e.g., Shipman v.
Fall 2009]
THE RE VIEW OF LITIGATION
Supreme Court ruling on the topic came in Graham v. Connor.29 Using
language reminiscent of common law negligence, the Court held that
deciding Fourth Amendment reasonableness "requires careful attention
to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." 30 The Graham
Court did not say whether the "reasonableness" inquiry was to be made
by the judge or the jury.31
Hamilton, 520 F.3d 775, 776-77, 781 (7th Cir. 2008) (seeking to serve a summons on
a hospital patient, an officer arrested a nurse who, according to the officer, obstructed
his work; the court held that on the plaintiffs version of the facts, there was no
obstruction and the right not be seized was clearly established, precluding qualified
immunity); (c) whether probable cause existed for a search, see, e.g., Graves v. City of
Coeur d'Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 844 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding insufficient evidence of
probable cause, since only evidence that could be considered was the fact that
protestor carried a heavy backpack with bulges in an "indisputably dangerous
setting"); (d) assuming probable cause, whether the search itself was reasonable, see,
e.g., Arachuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 1286-87 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that, in
the circumstances, a strip search violated the Fourth Amendment); and finally, (e)
when the police injure someone other than a person they were seeking to seize or
search, the relevant constitutional doctrine is substantive due process, see County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853-54 (1998) (holding plaintiff must show that
the officer's conduct shocks the conscience).
Of course, an incident may produce multiple claims, and one may succeed while
another fails. See, e.g., Holmes v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 687-88
(7th Cir. 2007) (concluding that illegal arrest claim fails but excessive-force claim
may succeed).
29. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
30. Id. at 396. In Scott, the Court added to this list the "relative culpability" of
the officer and the plaintiff. 550 U.S. at 384. Lower courts have also supplemented
this list of factors from time to time. See, e.g., Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147,
1159-60 (10th Cir. 2008) (determining whether the officer's "'reckless or deliberate
conduct' in connection with the arrest contributed to the need to use the force
employed" (quoting Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410,415 (10th Cir. 2008)));
Davis v. City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Courts may also
consider 'the availability of alternative methods of capturing or subduing a suspect."'
(quoting Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005))); Littrell v.
Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 583 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating "the result of the force" may be a
factor (quoting Crumley v. City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d 1003, 1007 (8th Cir. 2003)));
Robinson v. Solano County, 218 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2000) (considering
"whether the plaintiff was sober" (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 1440 n.5)).
31. See 490 U.S. at 396 (describing the Fourth Amendment test and stating that
"its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each
[Vol. 29:1
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The common law of torts, however, plainly opts for the jury. In
ordinary tort cases, the jury not only finds the facts, but also applies law
to fact, evaluating the conduct of the parties under the negligence
standard of "reasonable care. ' ' Even when the facts are not disputed,
the jury ordinarily makes these assessments.33 Thus, the Restatement
assigns to the jury responsibility for resolving factual disputes, 34 and
then describes its role in applying law to fact:
When, in light of all the facts relating to the actor's
conduct, reasonable minds can differ as to whether the
conduct lacks reasonable care, it is the function of the
jury to make that determination. 35
The court's responsibility in dealing with common law torts is
to oversee the jury on both fact finding and application of law to fact,
overturning verdicts or granting summary judgment and directed
verdicts where a reasonable jury could reach only one conclusion. 36
A. The Ambiguous Majority Opinion in Scott
Justice Scalia's opinion in Scott contains passages on both sides
of the judge-jury allocation issue. Some parts of the opinion imply that
particular case," without specifying whether the decision-maker should be the judge or
the jury). Later, the Court used the passive voice, perhaps in order to avoid the judge-
jury issue-"[t]he 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene." Id.
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 cmt. g ("If no standard of
obligatory conduct has been established... the jury must itself define the standard of
the reasonable man. .. ").
33. See Gergen, supra note 20, at 434 & n. 121 ("Where there is only normative
doubt about what is reasonable conduct, a judge could decide the issue without
intruding on the role of the jury as fact-finder. This possibility most clearly arises in a
case where the facts are undisputed but breach is contested. In negligence law, the
issue of breach goes to the jury in such a case."). The qualifier ("ordinarily") is
necessary because "in some cases reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion...
. Yet most of the time, the rule [on allocation of decision making between judge and
jury] calls for a jury decision on the negligence issue." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIABILIrY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 8 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 8(a)
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
35. Id. § 8(b).
36. Id. § 8 cmt. b.
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the issue is ordinarily for the jury, subject to standard judicial oversight.
The Court's opinion takes issue with "the version of the story told by
[Harris] and adopted by the Court of Appeals. 37 The chase was
recorded on videotape by cameras mounted in the police cars, and
"[t]he videotape quite clearly contradict[ed]" Harris's version of the
events.
38
There we see [Harris's] vehicle racing down narrow,
two-lane roads in the dead of night at speeds that are
shockingly fast. We see it swerve around more than a
dozen other cars, cross the double-yellow line, and force
cars traveling in both directions to their respective
shoulders to avoid being hit. We see it run multiple red
lights and travel for considerable periods of time in the
occasional center left-turn-only lane, chased by
numerous police cars forced to engage in the same
hazardous maneuvers just to keep up. Far from being
the cautious and controlled driver the lower court
depicts, what we see on the video more closely
resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of the most
frightening sort, placing police officers and innocent
bystanders alike at great risk of serious injury.39
The Court pointed out that, in applying the summary judgment
rule, the non-movant's perspective should be taken only if there is a
"genuine" factual dispute. 40 Here the plaintiff's version was "so utterly
discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed
him," and the Eleventh Circuit "should not have relied on such visible
fiction. ''4 1
If the reasonableness issue were for the jury, the opinion might
have ended there, remanding and giving directions to the district court
to instruct the jury that Harris's driving endangered others-a fact
which it should bear in mind in evaluating the reasonableness of Scott's
actions. Justice Scalia, however, found it necessary for the Court to
37. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 379-80 (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 380 (citing FED. R. CIrv. P. 56(c)).
41. Id. at 380-81.
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"slosh our way through the factbound morass of 'reasonableness.' 4 2
He went on to examine the substantive content of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness and apply that content to the facts of this case.43 Citing
a criminal case in which the reasonableness of a search was determined
by courts, he said that the task is to "balance the nature and quality of
the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the
intrusion." 44 In the high-speed chase, excessive-force context, he
continued, the specific issue is whether the need to stop the fleeing
motorist justifies the use of deadly force.45 Here, the videotape showed
that Harris "posed an actual and imminent threat" to pedestrians, other
motorists, and the police.46 At the same time, "Scott's actions posed a
high likelihood of serious injury or death to [Harris].'4
Given these competing considerations, the approach of common
law torts would be to ask the jury to balance them, subject to judicial
control in cases where the jury acts irrationally. But this is not what the
Court did in Scott. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia did not take on
the role of overseer, asking whether a reasonable jury could find that
Scott used excessive force. On the Court's behalf, he carried out the
excessive-force balancing calculation from scratch. He resolved the
difficulty of weighing one factor against the other by "tak[ing] into
account not only the number of lives at risk, but also their relative
culpability. '48 Harris's responsibility for the dangerous situation tipped
the balance in favor of finding that Scott's force was not excessive.49
Obliging the police to let Harris go, in the hope that he would slow
down, was not an acceptable alternative, for "there would have been no
way to convey convincingly to [Harris] that the chase was off," so he
"might have been just as likely to respond by continuing to drive
recklessly as by slowing down and wiping his brow." 50 Whether one
agrees or not with this line of reasoning, it contains nothing to suggest
that the reasonableness determination is for a jury in the first instance,
42. Id. at 383.
43. Id. at 383-84.
44. Id. at 383 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 384.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 385.
Fall 2009]
THE RE VIEW OF LITIGATION
subject to the usual highly deferential judicial oversight. It begins from
the premise that judges-including Supreme Court Justices-
themselves are to make the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
assessment.
B. Borrowing Common Law Doctrines
Sooner or later, the Court will be obliged to give the § 1983
judge-jury problem more systematic treatment than it did in Scott or
Graham. Whatever the Court meant to do in those cases, the Justices
inevitably will have to decide whether they wish to modify the common
law approach in § 1983 cases. The statute contains no provisions on the
many remedial issues that come up in suits for damages. 5' As a result,
the Supreme Court has undertaken a considerable amount of federal
common law making on the tort law aspects of the cause of action, such
as causation, immunity, and damages.52 Along the way, the Court has
declared that § 1983 "should be read against the background of tort
liability,, 53 and has often characterized § 1983 as creating "a species of
tort liability. 54 These elements of the Court's reasoning suggest that it
may be appropriate to borrow from the common law in allocating
responsibilities between judge and jury. Despite Scott, determinations
of Fourth Amendment reasonableness might be assigned to the jury by
analogy to common law negligence, where the issue of reasonable care
is for the jury, even where the facts are not in dispute. 55
Time and again the Supreme Court has turned to tort law in
deciding § 1983 issues, such as the scope of official immunity, cause in
51. See Michael Wells, Constitutional Remedies, Section 1983 and the Common
Law, 68 MIss. L.J. 157, 158 (1998) ("The usual source of answers to questions raised
by a statutory remedy is the statute itself. But referring to the text of [§ 1983] is
unavailing, because it does nothing more than authorize a remedy.").
52. See Wells, supra note 51, at 158-59 (giving a detailed examination of these
issues).
53. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), overruled on other grounds by
Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978); see
Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of TortLiability, 50 IND. L.J.
5, 7-13 (1974) (discussing the implications of this proposition for the development of
constitutional tort doctrine).
54. E.g., City of Monterey, v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,
709 (1999); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,483 (1994); Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist.
v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986).
55. See supra note 33.
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fact, proximate cause, damages, and municipal liability.56 In the
Court's opinions on § 1983, there often seems to be a presumption in
favor of following the common law.57 For example, the central
common law principle for compensatory damages is that they should
make the plaintiff whole for injury due to the wrong.58 In Carey v.
Piphus59 and Memphis School District v. Stachura60 the Court made
this common law principle the basic rule for § 1983 suits as well. Smith
v. Wade takes the common law as the model for punitive damage
awards. 6 1 In similar fashion, Pierson v. Ray62 borrowed from the
common law in making § 1983 official immunity doctrine, and Town of
Newton v. Rumery63 applied common law principles to enforce a
release-dismissal agreement. Common law principles for cause in
fact 64 and proximate cause65 also apply to constitutional torts.
These cases, and the analogical reasoning that undergirds them,
furnish grounds for borrowing from the common law, at least
presumptively, on the judge-jury allocation issue as well. On its face,
the Fourth Amendment's touchstone of "reasonableness" resembles the
"reasonable care" standard that dominates common law negligence. In
tort law, the issue of whether someone is at fault under this test is
66
ordinarily left to the jury, even where the facts are not at issue.
56. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
285-87 (1997) (cause in fact); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983) (damages);
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277,285 (1980) (municipal liability); Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 557 (1967) (official immunity).
57. See Wells, supra note 51, at 158, 160-76 (documenting the point).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND OF TORTS) § 903 (stating compensatory damages are
intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the
defendant's wrongful conduct).
59. 435 U.S. 247, 254-55, 257-58 (1978) (borrowing the compensation
principle from common law torts).
60. 477 U.S. 299, 306, 310 (1986) (applying the common law compensation
principle to free speech claims).
61. 461 U.S. at 34 (1983) (discussing common law punitive damages doctrine).
62. 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 557 (1967) (discussing common law official
immunity principles); see also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638-50
(1980) (discussing common law principles of municipal immunity).
63. 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (borrowing common law contract principles).
64. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,285-87
(1977) (utilizing the "but for" test for cause in fact, with the burden of proof on the
defendant).
65. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277,285 (1980) (remote consequences).
66. See supra note 33.
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"Reasoning by analogy is the most familiar form of legal reasoning, 67
and here the case for borrowing makes use of two analogies. The
analogy between common law tort and constitutional tort supports the
borrowing reflected in cases on damages, causation, and immunity.
Cases like Carey, Pierson, and Smith, thus, bolster the case for
borrowing the common law judge-jury framework. If simple
borrowing were the norm, Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Scott
would seem to be an anomaly, as he evidently rejects the common law
in favor of judicial decision making on reasonableness.68
In fact, however, the Court has not transplanted the common
law into § 1983 in wholesale fashion by means of a straightforward
analogy. What the Court has actually done in the causation, immunity,
and damages cases is to consider the strength of the constitutional tort-
common law tort analogy at the retail level, giving it more weight in
some contexts than others. In choosing remedial rules, for example, the
Court's central premise has been that those rules should further the
purposes of constitutional tort law. 69  Those purposes include
vindicating constitutional rights and deterring constitutional violations,
but doing so with an eye toward both the good and bad incentives that
the threat of liability may create. 70 The critical question for the Court in
most of the cases has been whether the purposes of § 1983 are well
served by borrowing the common law doctrine.71 If not, the Court
67. Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REv. 741, 741
(1993).
68. 550 U.S. 372, 384 (2007).
69. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (explaining that
"the recognition of a qualified immunity defense... reflected an attempt to balance
competing values: not only the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights
of citizens but also the need to protect officials who are required to exercise their
discretion") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Robertson v. Wegmann,
436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978) (finding no conflict between § 1983's compensation and
deterrence policies and a state survivorship rule that, on the facts of this case, abated
the cause of action). See also, Wells, supra note 51, at 190-91 (discussing the Court's
approach to causation and damages issues).
70. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-54 (1980)
(discussing compensation and deterrence); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253-56
(1978) (same). As noted supra in note 23, the Court's references to "compensation"
are best understood as shorthand for vindication of rights, for the Court's doctrine is
not designed to assure that constitutional wrongs will always be compensated. They
may nonetheless be adequately vindicated. See Jeffries, supra note , at 84-86
(discussing rationales for compensation).
71. See supra note 69.
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rejects application of that doctrine in favor of rules better suited to
§ 1983.72 In other words, the functional considerations bearing on
achieving the aims of constitutional tort law take priority over simply
borrowing common law rules. Thus, Carey v. Piphus held that the
common law rules of damages ordinarily apply in § 1983 cases, but the
Court took care to qualify its endorsement, by noting that "the interests
protected by a particular constitutional right may not also be protected
by an analogous branch of the common law [of] torts., 73 In such a case,
"the task will be the more difficult one of adapting common-law rules
of damages to provide fair compensation for injuries caused by the
deprivation of a constitutional right."
74
The Court's doctrine on official immunity shows how the Court
borrows from the common law without automatically importing it into
constitutional tort law. The common law background included an
immunity defense for officials charged with torts committed while
carrying out their duties. 75 Even if they violated the plaintiff's rights
and caused damage, they escaped liability on account of this
immunity. 76 The main policy behind immunity for government workers
is avoiding "overdeterrence" of bold and effective action by officers.77
The worry is that, absent some protection, government agents will be
overly cautious in the way they carry out their jobs-for action can
produce harm and lead to liability, while inaction seldom will. In
common law torts, the scope of the immunity varies depending on the
78
type of tort, the jurisdiction, the official, and the nature of his duties.
In Pierson v. Ray, the Court held that official immunity applies to
§ 1983 cases, relying on the common law doctrine for support. 79 But in
the Court's development of the immunity doctrine it has been alert to
72. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 & n.8 (1980) (rejecting
application of a sweeping state law immunity doctrine to § 1983 cases).
73. 435 U.S. 247, 254-58 (1978). See Jean C. Love, Damages: A Remedy for
the Violation of ConstitutionalRights, 67 CAL. L. REv. 1242 (1979) (discussing Carey
and the issues it raises).
74. Carey, 435 U.S. at 258.
75. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (discussing the common law
immunity defense available to police officers).
76. Id.
77. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (discussing the "social
costs" of allowing suits against officials).
78. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 732-37 (West 2000) (summarizing
the official immunity doctrine).
79. 386 U.S. 547, 553-57 (1967).
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the need to modify ordinary tort law in order to achieve the aims of
constitutional tort. For example, in some situations, the common law
rule grants executive officials absolute immunity. 80  Early in the
development of constitutional torts the Court rejected this rule,
however, because absolute immunity would thwart the vindication and
deterrence goals of § 1983.81
The Court has also broken with the common law in defining the
content of official immunity. Some of the Pierson defendants were
82police officers. As to them, the common law rule allowed a defense if
the officer acted with "good faith and probable cause," and the Court
borrowed this for § 1983 litigation. 83 Over time, the Court became
concerned that the "good faith" prong of this test, with its focus on the
subjective beliefs of the officer, made it hard to avoid a trial centering
on the officer's credibility. 84 The proliferation of trials undermined the
goal of avoiding overdeterrence because officers would be deterred
merely by the prospect of having to go to trial.85 As a result, in Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, the Court abandoned the "good faith" prong, adopting an
objective test that focuses on whether the official violated "clearly
established.., constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known." 86 In doing so, the Court jettisoned the common law
analogue it had adopted in Pierson fifteen years earlier.
87
C. Jury Trial: The Common Law/Constitutional Tort
Analogy
Carey and Harlow demonstrate the general principle that the
force of an argument from analogy depends on whether "A and B are
80. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 574 (1959) (holding federal official
is absolutely immune from liability for common law defamation).
81. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248 (1974) (stating if absolute immunity
were available, "§ 1983 would be drained of meaning"); see also Wells, supra note,
at 189-90 (discussing Barr and Scheuer).
82. 386 U.S. at 549.
83. Id. at 557.
84. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982) (discussing the
burdens involved in judicial inquiry into the subjective motivation of government
officials).
85. 457 U.S. at 817 ("Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation .. can be
peculiarly disruptive of effective government.").
86. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
87. See Wells, supra note 51, at 181-82 (discussing this shift).
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'relevantly' similar, and that there are not 'relevant' differences
between them. 88 In practice, of course, there will always be both
similarities and differences between A and B. With regard to the role
of the jury in § 1983 excessive-force cases, the question of whether to
borrow from common law negligence comes down to whether, in the
excessive-force context, the factors favoring the jury rank higher than
competing values.
The leading negligence case on the allocation of decision
making between judge and jury, decided at the dawn of modem tort
law, is Sioux City & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Stout.89 Then, as now,
negligence consisted of lack of "caution such as a man of ordinary
prudence would observe," 90 or "what would be blameworthy in the
average man, the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence," 9 1-who
was thus termed "the ordinarily prudent normal man."92 One well-
known English case put flesh on the bones of the reasonable person (at
least the male version) by describing him as "the man on the Clapham
omnibus," and "the man who takes the magazines at home, and in the
evening pushes the lawn mower in his shirt sleeves. 93 A jury chosen
from the community at large should make this determination, Stout
ruled, because "twelve men know more of the common affairs of life
than does one man," and "they can draw wiser and safer conclusions
from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge." 94 This
88. Sunstein, supra note , at 745.
89. 84 U.S. 657 (1873).
90. Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (C.P.) (Tindal, C.J.,
concurring).
91. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 87 (Mark D. Howe ed., Harvard
University Press 1963) (1881).
92. Roberts v. Ring, 173 N.W. 437, 438 (Minn. 1919).
93. Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club, [1933] 1 K.B. 205, 224.
94. 84 U.S. at 664. Professor Gergen stresses the normative implications of
assigning the breach of duty issue to the jury:
That the issue of breach is put to the jury even when facts are free of
doubt shows that in negligence law independent value is put on the jury
deciding what is reasonable conduct when the normative issue is open to
debate. This is where what I call the values of popular judgment come into
play. The many celebrations of the jury's role in negligence focus more on
the jury's role in deciding normative issues than the jury's role in deciding
factual issues.
See Gergen, supra note, at 435.
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view has held sway ever since and is reiterated in the Third Restatement
of Torts.95
Since one or another version of "reasonableness" is at the core
of both common law negligence and Fourth Amendment excessive-
force cases, one may attempt to argue by analogy for jury trial for at
least this particular constitutional tort issue. 96 The problem with the
argument by analogy is that there is a relevant difference between
constitutional torts and common law torts. The rationale for jury
decision making advanced in Stout and generally endorsed by common
law courts is that a group of ordinary citizens will likely have a better
feel for what constitutes "ordinary care" than will one judge. 97 But the
force of this reasoning is diminished in the Fourth Amendment
excessive-force context. It is true that the perspective of the ordinary
person influences the content and application of some Fourth
Amendment principles, notably in determining whether a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a given set of circumstances.
98
Even so, the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" test (including in
excessive-force cases) is not simply an application of the general tort
95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 8 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2001) ("The jury is assigned the responsibility of rendering such judgments partly
because several minds are better than one, and also because of the desirability of
taking advantage of the insight and values of the community, as embodied in the jury,
rather than relying on the professional knowledge of the judge.").
96. Focusing on negligence law may make the analogical argument for jury
decision making in constitutional tort seem stronger than it actually is. Even in the
common law, the role of the jury varies from one tort to another. While the jury's
authority is considerable in negligence, "[h]istorically, the jury has had little to say on
normative issues in administering the torts of battery, assault, trespass, and conversion,
[because] these torts take the form of categorical rules that, on their face, ask for no
normative judgment at the point of application." Gergen, supra note, at 439. Gergen
also shows that the jury's role in classical contract law is far more limited than in
negligence. See id at 440-61 (stating that because of highly formalized rules, judges
generally make normative decisions). He argues that the reason for the difference is
that we place more value "on having normative determinations made by people with
legal training and the perspective of judges" in contract law. Id. at 410.
97. See Stout, 84 U.S. at 664 ("It is assumed that twelve men know more of
common affairs of life than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer
conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge.").
98. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006) ("The constant
element in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness in the consent cases ... is the
great significance given to widely shared social expectations.")
[Vol. 29:1
JURY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
standard of care. 99 Unlike the common law negligence principle, the
Fourth Amendment is not directed toward all members of society, but
only toward governments and their officers.' 00  The broad aim of
common law negligence is to assign liability for personal injury to
faulty actors but without any well-defined goal in mind. As Professor
Kenneth Abraham has noted, "the law of torts has grown and evolved,
state-by-state, without any central, self-conscious authority to make it
responsive to a clear set of express goals."'
0
'
The far more focused aim of Fourth Amendment excessive-
force doctrine is to curb the power of officials to search and seize
persons and property as they wield the state's monopoly of force. o2 In
setting the basic Fourth Amendment excessive-force standard, the Court
in Graham evidently did not borrow from the common law, rather it
drew on earlier Fourth Amendment precedents. 10 3  Adjudicating
99. It is possible that "reasonableness" in tort law ought to be given the same
content as "reasonableness" in the Fourth Amendment. But the Supreme Court has
never said so, and at least one Circuit disputes the notion that the two are the same.
See Long v. Slaton, 508 F.3d 576, 580 n.6 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating Fourth
Amendment's "reasonableness" standard and the "standard of reasonable care" under
tort law are not the same). Given that the Fourth Amendment addresses a
comparatively narrow range of cases involving the relations between the state and the
individual, while the common law of torts reaches a vast array of interactions, and
given the different policy considerations bearing on each, Long seems persuasive on
this point.
100. Like all provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Fourth Amendment's guarantee reaches only "state action." See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 507 (3d ed. 2006).
Only in a few circumstances are private entities deemed to be state actors. See id. at
517-39 for a general discussion.
101. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 14 (3d
ed., Foundation Press 2007). According to some scholars, the explanation, and
perhaps justification, for unwillingness to construct a more coherent body of
negligence law, lies in reluctance to make definitive choices among competing values
and thus creating a preference for leaving those choices to juries on a case-by-case
basis. Gergen, supra note, at 436 & n. 129. To the extent this is true, constitutional
tort law differs rather sharply from negligence law. Here the constitutional values
enforced in § 1983 litigation have already been reasonably well-defined, in part by the
text and original understanding of the document and in part by over two centuries of
Supreme Court decisions.
102. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) ("[T]he Fourth
Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this
sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct.").
103. See id. at 396 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)
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excessive-force cases does not call for a determination of what a person
of ordinary prudence would do or not do. It involves a balancing of
competing concerns to ascertain whether the police crossed a
constitutional line.' 
0 4
I1. JUDGE VS. JURY IN CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS
Identifying differences between constitutional and common law
torts undermines the argument by analogy and thereby helps to make
the case for limiting the role of the jury in § 1983 cases. This, however,
is only one step in the argument. Showing that constitutional torts
differ from common law torts does not fully answer the question of
whether judges or juries should decide law application issues in
constitutional torts. It just allows us to direct our attention to the
distinctive features of the constitutional context without being
distracted by misleading common law comparisons. This Part of the
article discusses two aspects of the constitutional setting that are of
distinctive importance. First, if the judge-jury issue is viewed from the
perspective of constitutional theory, it cannot be resolved without
making a hard choice between competing substantive values. Second,
the hard choice at the level of theory is an easier one at the level of
practice. From a pragmatic perspective there is a strong case for
favoring judges over juries in § 1983 litigation, because otherwise suits
for damages cannot effectively serve the goals of constitutional tort
law-vindicating constitutional rights and deterring violations.' 05 The
(holding that a dog sniffing a suitcase is not a "search," so evidence obtained in this
way can be admitted in a ciiminal trial despite Fourth Amendment objections));
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-10, 12-19 (1985) (relying on Fourth Amendment
precedent and rejecting the defendants' suggestion that it adopt the common law rule
on the use of deadly force); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979)
(considering standards governing when an arrestee may be incarcerated pending trial);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1968) (where the issue was the validity of an
investigatory stop).
104. In Scott, the Court stated that "in judging whether Scott's actions were
reasonable, we must consider the risk of bodily harm that Scott's actions posed to
[Harris] in light of the threat to the public that Scott was trying to eliminate." 550
U.S. 372,383 (2007). It also took into account the "relative culpability" of Scott and
Harris, counting this against Harris since he bore responsibility for the situation. Id. at
384.
105. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-54 (1980)
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practical problem, in a nutshell, is that the official immunity doctrine
will always stand in the way of liability unless substantive
constitutional law is stated in the form of rules, and only judges can
make rules.
A. Constitutional Values and Jury Trial in Section 1983
Litigation
Commenting on the American political institutions in the 1830s,
Alexis de Tocqueville noted the role of the jury in promoting
democratic values: "The institution of the jury ... places the real
direction of society in the hands of the governed."' 10 6 According to
Akhil Amar, "[n]o idea was more central to our Bill of Rights-indeed,
to America's distinctive regime of government of the people, by the
people, and for the people-than the idea of the jury."' 107  The
democratic value ofjury decision making has direct relevance to § 1983
litigation. Catherine Struve suggests that "a jury finding of liability in a
civil rights case serves as a more effective pronouncement than a
judge's disposition would, because it can be seen as embodying the
judgment of representatives of the community."' 8 Professor Amar
maintains that, for the framers of the Bill of Rights, in "both civil and
criminal proceedings, the key role of the jury was to protect ordinary
individuals against governmental overreaching." 10 9 In addition, serving
on a jury would educate citizens, "instill[ing] republican legal and
political virtues," 110 and would permit "ordinary Citizens [to]
(discussing compensation and deterrence); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253-56
(1978) (same). As noted supra in note 23, the Court's references to "compensation"
are best understood as shorthand for vindication of rights, for the Court's doctrine is
not designed to assure that constitutional wrongs will always be compensated. They
still may be adequately vindicated. See Jeffries, supra note , at 84-86 (discussing
rationales for compensation).
106. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 260 (Harvey C.
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., University of Chicago Press 2000).
107. Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 1169, 1169 (1995).
108. Catherine T. Struve, Constitutional Decision Rules for Juries, 37 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 659, 706-07 (2006).
109. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J.
1131, 1183 (1991).
110. Id.at1186.
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participate in the application of national law.""' The jury system
"summed up-indeed embodied-the ideals of populism, federalism,
and civic virtue that were the essence of the original Bill of Rights."
' 12
Professor Amar's proposed revival of the jury is directly
relevant to the role ofjuries in excessive-force cases. He asserts that, in
our early history, "the preferred vehicle for litigating the Fourth
Amendment was a tort suit brought by a citizen and tried before a
Seventh Amendment jury of fellow citizens." 113 He would "revive this
grand tradition" by giving juries a predominant (though not wholly
defined) role in "assessing the mixed fact and law question of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness." '" 14 Amar, however, does not appear to
make a constitutional argument that either the Fourth or the Seventh
Amendment requires jury trial; at least, he never flatly asserts that
proposition.' 15 As I understand his thesis, it draws on the tradition of
judicial policy making in § 1983 litigation over issues like immunity,
causation, and damages. Jury trial should be favored in these cases, in
his view, because the jury's essential role is one of checking
governmental oppression. 1 6 Accordingly, Fourth Amendment values
would be better served by allocating these issues to juries. 117 Justice
Stevens's dissent in Scott makes a similar argument. Some of his
language vaguely suggests a constitutional objection to the Court's
resolution of the case: Justice Stevens speaks of the plaintiff's "right"
to a jury trial," 18 and maintains that "[w]hether a person's actions have
risen to a level warranting deadly force is a question of fact best
reserved for a jury."' 19 But he never claims that the "right" is a
constitutional right and never so much as mentions the Seventh
111. Id.at1187.
112. Id. at 1190.
113. Amar, supra note, at 1171.
114. Id. at 1191-92.
115. Id. at 1192; see Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,
388 (1996) (rejecting a strictly historical methodology in interpreting the Seventh
Amendment: "functional considerations" bear on whether judges or juries are better
suited to resolve a particular issue); see also Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury
Decision on Questions of Fact Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L. J. 1125,
1128-29 (2003) (discussing recent cases and suggesting that such an argument would
likely fail in any event).
116. Amar, supra note, at 1191.
117. Id. at 1191-92.
118. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 390 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 395.
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Amendment.
By contrast, the Court in Scott seems to take it for granted that
judges are authorized to make Fourth Amendment reasonableness
determinations. Like the Scott majority, many lower courts
adjudicate Fourth Amendment reasonableness issues, rather than
allocate them to the jury,121 without justifying the choice ofjudges over
jurors or even acknowledging that they are making a choice. In Bell v.
Irwin, Judge Easterbrook did address the issue. 22 Turning down the
plaintiffs argument for a jury determination of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness, he said:
[T]he Constitution is not a form of tort law. It creates
legal rules. Permitting the jury to determine for itself
whether particular conduct was reasonable within the
meaning of the fourth amendment would introduce the
ex post reassessment that Graham decried. Under the
Constitution, the right question is how things appeared
to objectively reasonable officers at the time of the
events, not how they appear in the courtroom to a cross-
section of the civilian community.'
23
This anti-hindsight argument is unconvincing because it rests on
a faulty premise as to the role of the jury in tort law. In ordinary
negligence cases the jury is specifically instructed to ask what a
reasonable person in the actor's position would have done and is
cautioned against hindsight. 24  In the common law, as in Fourth
Amendment cases, the right question is "how things appeared to
objectively reasonable [actors] at the time of the events."',25
120. See id. at 381 (majority opinion) (Justice Scalia stating that Justice Stevens
incorrectly concludes that "reasonableness" is a question of fact, when it is "purely" a
question of law).
121. See cases cited supra note for illustrative cases.
122. 321 F.3d 637, 690 (7th Cir. 2003).
123. Id. at 640.
124. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (THIRD), supra note 34, § 3 cmt. g ("To
establish the actor's negligence, it is not enough that there be a likelihood of harm; the
likelihood must be foreseeable to the actor at the time of conduct."); id. reporter's
note, at 65 ("Many opinions ...emphasize that in considering negligence it is
foresight rather than 'hindsight' that should be relied on.").
125. Bell v. Irwin, 321 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2003).
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Judge Easterbrook's failure to come up with a good answer to
the case for the jury does not mean that none exist. Perhaps what he
means to say is that juries cannot be expected to avoid hindsight in any
kind of case,126 no matter how they are instructed; that excessive
liability has especially bad consequences for effective police work; and
that the value of effective police work overrides the values served by
jury rulings on Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Before accepting
the Stevens-Amar-Blum-Struve thesis, courts should consider that
possible objection. Other potential disadvantages to jury evaluations of
excessive-force claims also deserve attention. Arguments that may be
advanced in favor of the judge include:
Judges deal with Fourth Amendment issues
every day in both criminal and civil contexts.
Simply on account of their expertise, they may
be better suited to resolve them than juries.
* The general argument for summaryjudgment as
a means of efficiently adjudicating disputes' 27
supports judicial resolution of Fourth
Amendment issues.
0 Studies suggest that the amount juries award in
damages depends partly on whether they think128
defendants have plenty of money. As a result,
plaintiffs may fare badly in cases where the only
126. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 572-74 (1998) (discussing "hindsight bias").
Note, however, that the psychological literature on which Professor Rachlinski relies
does not distinguish between judges and juries. See id. at 595 (lumping judges and
juries together). Absent a showing that judges are less prone to hindsight bias than
juries, it does not seem possible to argue for allocating "reasonableness" rulings to
judges rather than to juries solely on the basis of hindsight bias.
127. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (stating that the
purpose of summary judgment is to avoid "unwarranted consumption of public and
private resources" due to unnecessary trials).
128. See James K. Hammitt, Stephen J. Carroll & Daniel A. Relies, Tort
Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 751, 754-56 (1985) ("Compared
with individual defendants, our model predicts that corporate defendants pay 34
percent larger awards, after controlling for plaintiffs' injuries and type of case.").
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defendant is a police officer; conversely, juries
may unfairly impose liability on municipal
defendants or even on officers if they believe
that insurance is available.
Another concern in § 1983 litigation is that
juries may tend to favor some plaintiffs over
others, depending on whether a given plaintiff is
a person with whom jurors can identify or
sympathize. Some plaintiffs in excessive-force
cases are middle-class citizens who have had an
unpleasant experience with the police, 129 while
others are mentally ill, petty criminals, or
worse. 130  There is a risk that jury
determinations of reasonableness would
systematically favor the first class of plaintiffs
over the second.
B. The Case for Rules in Constitutional Tort Law
If the answer to the judge-jury question depended solely on an
assessment of the constitutional values served by jury versus judicial
decision making, the Stevens-Amar-Blum-Struve position may well
prevail in spite of these countervailing considerations. Some
constitutional values would benefit from assigning Fourth Amendment
reasonableness and other law application questions to the jury, while
others may call for allocating law application to judges. There may be
an interpretive principle, such as the intent of the framers, that enables
us to choose between them. Alternatively, resolving the issue may
require that the Court simply decide which set of competing values it
129. See, e.g., Zivojinovich v. Bamer, 525 F.3d 1059, 1062-63 (1 1th Cir. 2008)
(plaintiffs had become drunk and disorderly at a hotel party); Davenport v. Causey,
521 F.3d 544, 546-47 (6th Cir. 2008) (traffic stop); Winterrowd v. Nelson, 480 F.3d
1181, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 2007) (traffic stop).
130. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Barber, 517 F.3d 389, 391-93 (6th Cir. 2008)
(plaintiffs had been suspected of auto theft); Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 408-09
(5th Cir. 2007) (altercation occurred when deputies attempted to serve a felony arrest
warrant); Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2006) (plaintiff was a
psychologically disturbed man who drove through town "stopping occasionally to fire
his gun in the air").
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finds more attractive.
But it is neither necessary nor desirable to address the judge-
jury problem at such a high level of abstraction. In the real world of
constitutional litigation, there are good reasons for favoring judge over
jury. Focusing on the form in which constitutional law should be
stated, the core of the argument is that rules should be favored over
multifactored tests in § 1983 damages cases generally and in excessive-
force cases in particular. On that premise, judges should be favored
over juries because only judges can make rules. Stating excessive-force
law in the form of rules would oblige courts to single out a few
determinative features of a fact pattern rather than employ standards
that turn on case-by-case evaluation of many factors. Broadly speaking,
the issue is whether the benefits of rules are worth their significant
costs, which mainly result from the necessarily arbitrary lines they
draw. I attempt to show that we would be better off bearing the costs of
arbitrary lines because there is no realistic alternative. While the focus
here is on excessive force, the general argument applies to other
constitutional rights that are typically litigated in suits for damages.
The building blocks of this argument are two distinctive features
of § 1983 litigation: (a) that the § 1983 goals of vindicating
constitutional rights and deterring constitutional violations cannot be
achieved absent liability for damages and (b) that the "official
immunity" doctrine blocks liability for damages unless the law is
"clearly established." These aspects of§ 1983 litigation require that the
law be stated, insofar as possible, in the form of rules. A corollary of
this reasoning is that the Court's principal excessive-force case,
Graham v. Connor,131 should be reconsidered. The Court held in
Graham that the "proper application" of the Fourth Amendment in this
context "requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of
each particular case."' 132 The question is "whether the totality of the
circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of ... seizure." 133 A regime
of rules would necessarily topple Graham, for it would suppress rather
than encourage "careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each
particular case."
' 134
131. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
132. Id. at 396.
133. Id. (quoting Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985)).
134. Id.
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1. Form and Substance in Constitutional Torts
Graham's focus on case-by-case adjudication reflects a
choice-an unwise choice, in my view-as to how legal norms should
be formulated for excessive-force cases. Broadly speaking, the question
here is whether the law should be stated in the form of standards that
require careful attention to the specifics of the case at hand, or in the
form of rules that pick out a few salient factors, excluding other features
of a given case.1 35 For example, the pre-Graham decision in Tennessee
v. Garner sets forth a rule that "[w]here the officer has probable cause
to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either
to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to
prevent escape by using deadly force." 136 A court does not consider all
the circumstances bearing on the use of deadly force, but only whether
"the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat
of serious physical harm."'
137
The rules-versus-standards issue differs slightly from the
judge-jury problem, as standards may be applied by either the judge or
the jury. Nonetheless, the two are closely related. Since juries cannot
make rules, choosing rules over standards necessarily entails a greater
role for judges. By adopting a regime in which the particulars of the
case at hand would drive the outcome, Graham implicitly opted for a
135. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510, 536-37 (1988)
(drawing this distinction).
136. 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985); see Blum, supra note , at 57-58 (discussing the
impact of this rule on law enforcement practices). One of the advantages of rules,
illustrated by police department adoption of Garner's test, is that those subject to them
can easily "internalize" them. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE
121-28 (1991) (discussing the internalization of rules).
137. Two cases in which the officer shot a suspect illustrate the narrow focus of
the inquiry. Compare Carr v. Deeds, 453 F.3d 593, 601 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding no
constitutional violation where the victim "refused [the officer's] command to place his
hands in view, jumped from the vehicle, fired at least two rounds from his handgun,
and fled into the woods"), with Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 697 (6th Cir. 2005)
(finding constitutional violation where, according to plaintiff, victim's "hand was at all
times visible and ... never entered into his jacket pocket").
One of the benefits of rules is that they provide the actors to whom they are
directed with the information they need to comply with legal norms. In this regard,
Blum, supra note , at 57-58, discusses law enforcement agencies' responses to
Garner.
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regime of flexible standards over undertaking to articulate rules of
general application; Graham "nearly always requires a jury to sift
through disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences
therefrom."' 138 The Court did not identify rules versus standards as an
issue in Graham, much less explain why it rejected a rules-based
approach. Perhaps the common law analogy influenced its ruling, since
reasonableness determinations in negligence law generally depend on
the circumstances of particular cases. In any event, no Justice dissented
on this issue in Graham.
Though § 1983 excessive-force cases come to the federal courts
with regularity, Graham's lack of attention to the rules-versus-
standards question has had the effect of burying that issue. The
underpinnings of Graham's preference of standards over rules have
received little scrutiny from the Court, lower courts, or in academic
literature. It is time to make a start toward remedying that lack of
attention. As in any other area where a choice must be made between
rules and standards, there are values on either side. My view is that in
the § 1983 excessive-force context, a compelling case can be made for
rules over standards.
Constitutional rights would be worth little without effective
remedies for their breach. Violations of constitutional rights occur in a
wide range of circumstances, so that enforcing them requires a variety
of remedies. A criminal defendant challenging the validity of the
statute under which he is prosecuted can assert his constitutional rights
by raising the unconstitutionality of the statute as a defense. The
exclusionary rule may be an effective remedy for some Fourth
Amendment violations, but as a practical matter it can be raised only in
cases where the prosecution seeks to use illegally collected evidence. 1
39
Ongoing violations and threatened future ones can be effectively
remedied by injunctive or other prospective relief that directs officials
to comply with constitutional norms. Some kinds of constitutional
138. Sallenger v, Oakes, 473 F.3d 731, 742 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Abdullahi
v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 773 (7th Cir. 2005)). This is an unavoidable
consequence of stating the legal norm in general terms, as the Court did in Graham.
See Hart & Sacks, supra note, at 351 ("[T]he more imprecise the general formulation
[of law], the more uncontrolled the judgment [of the law applier] will be.")
139. As Justice Harlan observed, for the victim of an illegal search who is not
prosecuted, "it is damages or nothing." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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wrongs, however, cannot be remedied by any of those means. In
excessive-force cases, for example, the Fourth Amendment violation
cannot be raised as a defense. 140 The § 1983 plaintiff may or may not
also be a criminal defendant. Even if he is, the constitutional violation
will probably be irrelevant to the criminal case, and would not be
remedied by a successful defense to the criminal prosecution.
Prospective relief is unavailing because it is only available to a litigant
who can show a likelihood of future injury, and victims of excessive
force in a past encounter with the police can rarely meet that
requirement. 41 For these many litigants, the only useful remedy is a
suit for damages.
2. The Impact of Qualified Immunity on the
Goals of Section 1983
The official immunity doctrine stands as a significant
impediment to obtaining damages in § 1983 suits. Police officers are
ordinarily entitled to qualified immunity, which means that they are
shielded from suits for damages unless their conduct violates "clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known."' 142 The aim is to give the officer "fair
notice" of what the constitution forbids. 143 There is considerable
tension between Graham's case-by-case approach to the excessive-
force merits and the "clearly established law" principle. When the
resolution of the substantive constitutional issue depends on the facts
and circumstances of each particular case, some of the facts are likely to
favor one side and some the other, so that the officer can show that the
prior cases send mixed signals and do not provide fair notice. Under
140. The point here is simply that the officer's use of excessive force in making
an arrest is not a defense to any crime for which the person arrested may be charged.
If the arrestee's constitutional rights are violated in the course of the arrest, the only
means available to him for vindicating those rights may be a suit for damages.
141. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (requiring the
plaintiff show that he will likely be the victim of a similar violation in the future).
This point is discussed in somewhat greater detail in Part V.B infra.
142. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
143. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 742 (2002); see generally Amanda K.
Eaton, Note, Optical Illusions: The Hazy Contours of the Clearly Established Law
and the Effects of Hope v. Pelzer on the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, 38 GA. L. REv.
661 (2004) (discussing, in detail, Hope and its implications).
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this regime, he will often have grounds for official immunity. Only
when the officer's conduct is especially egregious will it be possible to
overcome the immunity doctrine. 144
Brosseau v. Haugen145 illustrates the difficulty plaintiffs face
when official immunity is litigated under a doctrinal regime like that of
Graham. Brosseau, a police officer, shot Haugen as he attempted to
evade arrest by driving away. 14 6 Haugen brought a § 1983 suit for
damages, charging that the use of a gun was excessive force.
147
Without reaching the merits, the Court held that Brosseau was entitled
to immunity. 148 Graham and Garner, which "are cast at a high level of
generality," did not suffice to provide fair notice. 149 According to the
Court, the law must be clearly established in a more "particularized"
sense, such that "a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates [the] right."'150 The Court implied, without explicitly
holding, that in nonobvious cases courts must resort to "a body of
relevant case law" to answer the "clearly established law" issue. 151 In
any event, it proceeded to examine the "handful of cases" featuring
circumstances most closely resembling the encounter between Brosseau
and Haugen. 152 There were three cases in which the officer faced the
144. Such cases do come up from time to time. In Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d
1253, 1272-74 (11 th Cir. 2008), officers responded to a domestic violence complaint
at an apartment complex and made an arrest. According to Reese, the owner and
caretaker of the apartments, he then asked officers to move their cars so that other
tenants could get to their apartments. Id. at 1257-58. He was arrested, choked,
thrown to the ground, pepper-sprayed and otherwise abused. Id. at 1272-73. Ruling
on the officers' summary judgment motion, the court first held that, under the
plaintiffs version of the incident, the officers had no probable cause to arrest the
plaintiff, who merely asked officers to move their cars, and hence had no authority to
use any force. Id. at 1271-73. Denying qualified immunity despite the absence of a
similar prior case, the court said "[n]o particularized, preexisting case law was needed
to inform [the officers] that an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity where his
conduct goes 'so far beyond the hazy border between excessive and acceptable force
that [he knows that he is] violating the Constitution."' Id. at 1274 (quoting Priester v.
City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926-27 (1 1th Cir. 2000)).
145. 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam).
146. Id. at 194.
147. Id. at 194-95.
148. Id. at 195.
149. Id. at 199.
150. Id. at 198-99 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001)).
151. Id. at 199.
152. Id. at 200.
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question "whether to shoot a disturbed felon, set on avoiding capture
through vehicular flight, when persons in the immediate area are at risk
from that flight."' 153 None of them were on all fours with Brosseau. In
two of the three no Fourth Amendment violation was found. The Court
observed that "[t]hese three cases taken together undoubtedly show that
this area is one in which the result depends very much on the facts of
each case," and ruled that they "by no means 'clearly establish' that
Brosseau's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment."
'1 54
Combining Graham's "facts and circumstances" test with
Brosseau's "particularized" qualified immunity doctrine produces
devastating results for the constitutional values that are at stake in
excessive-force cases. Even if the plaintiff has a good case on the
merits, damages will rarely, if ever, be available on account of official
immunity. 155 The Graham/Brosseau doctrine illustrates the need for
the Court to be attentive to the relation between form and substance in
constitutional tort law. In formulating the constitutional doctrine giving
rise to § 1983 damages suits, a central concern must be to strive for
153. Id.
154. Id. at 206. One of the two prior cases finding no Fourth Amendment
violation was Cole v. Bone, where "an 18-wheel tractor-trailer sped through a toll
booth and engaged the police in a high-speed pursuit in excess of 90 miles per hour on
a high-traffic interstate during the holiday season." Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 206 n.4
(discussing 993 F.2d 1328, 1330-31 (8th Cir. 1993)) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
other was Smith v. Freland, in which "the suspect led a police officer on a high-speed
chase, reaching speeds in excess of 90 miles per hour." Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 206 n.4
(discussing 954 F.2d 343, 344 (6th Cir. 1992)) (Stevens, J., dissenting). When the
officer cornered the suspect, "the driver repeatedly swerved directly toward the police
car. Only after the suspect smashed directly into an unoccupied police car and began
to flee again, did the officer finally shoot the driver." Id. In view of the framework
established in Hope and the differences between Cole and Smith, on the one hand, and
Brosseau on the other, one is inclined to sympathize with Justice Stevens's view that
Cole and Smith are, at best, "inapposite." Id. at 205.
155. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Barber, 517 F.3d 389, 399, 401-02 (6th Cir. 2008).
Following Graham's "facts and circumstances" approach, the court engaged in a
detailed analysis of the reasonableness of a police officer's action "when he ordered
the [plaintiffs] to the ground at gunpoint and held them there despite their
unsuspicious, nonthreatening behavior." Id. at 401-02. After agreeing with the
district judge that "the level of force used by [the officer] was at least arguably
excessive," the court went on to uphold the officer's qualified immunity claim,
reasoning that "[t]he contours of the right to freedom from the use of excessive force
were not so clearly established in a particularized sense that a reasonable officer
would have known that such conduct was unlawful." Id. at 402.
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black-letter rules that clearly state the law and in this way diminish the
role of official immunity. The problem with jury decision making on
Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims is not that juries make bad
decisions. It is that a large role for the jury in evaluating conduct in
cases about Fourth Amendment reasonableness is incompatible with the
overriding need for rule-based decision making in § 1983 litigation.' 56
III. RULES VS. STANDARDS IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
A. Judge Posner 's Folly
Some lower courts do not fully appreciate the implications of
Brosseau and seem oblivious to the need to develop rules in response to
that case. Consider Judge Posner's opinion in Richman v. Sheahan.1
57
Jack Richman's mother had received a traffic ticket and wanted to fight
it. 158 The mother and her son had spent several hours waiting in an
Illinois state courtroom for her case to be called, but at 4:00 P.M. the
judge told them he was continuing the case until the next day. 159 The
Richmans were upset, argued, and upon being told to leave, refused to
do so.' 60 Eventually, the judge held Jack Richman in contempt and
ordered two deputy sheriffs to arrest him. 16 1 The difficulty was that
156. See, e.g., Parks v. Pomeroy, 387 F.3d 949, 955-58 (8th Cir. 2004). After
ruling that "the issue of whether Pomeroy used objectively unreasonable force when
he fatally shot Parks is a question of fact" for the jury, the court went on to find
qualified immunity, because the excessive-force issue could be argued either way. Id.
at 955-56. Thus, "even if we assume that Pomeroy could see Parks's left hand on the
floor at the moment of the shooting, it cannot be disputed that Gottstein's gun was
nevertheless just inches from Parks's hand." Id. at 957-58.
Sometimes courts, albeit inadvertently, acknowledge their failure to formulate
Fourth Amendment norms in a sufficiently rule-like way. See Evans v. City of
Zebulon, 351 F.3d 485, 495 (11 th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he general legal principles stated in
[earlier cases] do not apply with such obvious clarity to the facts of this case that no
reasonable officer could have believed that the manner in which the strip
searches.. . were performed was unconstitutional."). The lesson the court should take
away from Evans is that its directives should be stated with greater clarity in the
future.
157. 512 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2008).
158. Id. at 880.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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Jack Richman, 34 years old, and 6 feet two inches tall, weighed 489
pounds:
[W]hen the two deputies tried to remove Richman
forcibly, he clung to the podium and they could not
dislodge him. Additional deputies.., now entered the
courtroom and tried to seize Richman....
... [T]he struggle... continued for a few
minutes until the deputies managed to drag him from
the podium to the floor, where he lay prone, his face
down, but continued to struggle with what was by now a
swarm of deputies. They tried to handcuff him and
eventually succeeded. By then, several of them were on
Richman's back.... Richman screamed that he
couldn't breathe. Then he fell quiet and the deputies
noticed that... his skin had turned blue. He was
dead.'
62
Richman's mother sued on behalf of his estate, claiming
excessive force. 163  Rejecting the officers' motion for summary
judgment, Judge Posner reasoned that "[w]hat counts as excessive force
in a particular case is ... relative to circumstances, and two
circumstances are critical so far as Jack Richman's Fourth Amendment
claim is concerned."' 164 One was his extreme, and obvious, obesity,
which rendered him "very frail. 165 The other was "the lack of urgency
to remove him from the courtroom."' 66 For Judge Posner, the
combination of these two factors was enough to justify denial of
summary judgment not only on the Fourth Amendment issue, but on
immunity as well:
There was no reason to endanger his life in order to
remove him with such haste. A reasonable jury could
find that the deputies used excessive force. This
conclusion, since the legal standard governing
excessive-force claims is well-established and clearly
162. Id.
163. Id. at 879.
164. Id. at 883.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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applicable to a situation in which officers suffocate an
obviously vulnerable person, scotches the immunity
defense. 1
67
The problem with this reasoning is that it pays insufficient
attention to Brosseau's directive that law must be clearly established in
a "particularized" sense, such that "a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates [the] right."'168 Judge Posner
cites three cases for the proposition that the legal standard is well-
established, but none of them addresses a situation like the one in
Richman.169 In any event, Graham lists "actively resisting arrest" as a
factor bearing on reasonableness. 170 In light of all this, the officers who
seized Richman may well have to have a well-founded immunity claim
despite Judge Posner's holding to the contrary.
B. An Emerging Body of Rules
By contrast, Hadley v. Gutierrez'71 shows how rule-making can
diminish the role of qualified immunity to the benefit of the vindication
and deterrence goals of § 1983. In Hadley, an officer had, according to
the complaint, "struck [Hadley] in the stomach even though he was not
struggling or resisting."'' 72 Upholding the district court's denial of
summary judgment to one of the officers, the court relied on a rule
167. Id.
168. Brousseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 596, 599 (2004).
169. Richman, 512 F.3d at 883 (citing Sallengerv. Oakes, 473 F.3d 731, 740-
42 (7th Cir. 2007) (the officers may have used force after the plaintiff was
handcuffed); Cruz v. City of Laramie, 239 F.3d 1183, 1187-90 (10th Cir. 2001)
(officers hog-tied a naked and seriously intoxicated man); Clash v. Beatty, 77 F.3d
1045, 1047-48 (7th Cir. 1996) (the officer may have shoved plaintiff into a police car
without provocation, injuring his knee)). As for Richman, the officers may actually be
right on the merits of the Fourth Amendment issue, as many cases allow officers to use
some force against an arrestee who resists. See, e.g., Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449,
455 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that a small amount of force was justified because the
plaintiff "was, at a minimum, arguing with [the officers] and refusing to return the
order"); Mann v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the officer's
use of a canine in a "bite and hold maneuver on [defendant's] leg" was not
unreasonable force).
170. Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
171. 526 F.3d 1324 (1 th Cir. 2008).
172. Id. at 1330.
[Vol. 29:1
JURY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
developed in earlier cases, that "gratuitous use of force when a criminal
suspect is not resisting arrest constitutes excessive force. 173 Since this
outcome involved the application of a rule, it was "clearly established"
that "a handcuffed, non-resisting" arrestee could not be struck.174 As a
result, the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity.' 75 Of course,
the historical facts as to whether the officer engaged in the wrongful
conduct were in dispute and would have to be tried by a jury. Other
cases where official immunity was denied because courts had recourse
to "clearly established" rules include: Jones v. Cincinnati, applying a
173. Id. The court never calls this proposition a rule, yet it has the attributes of
a rule, in that it identifies a few aspects of the situation that will control the outcome,
to the exclusion of other arguably relevant factors. See Schauer, supra note, at 536-
37 ("The distinctive feature of rules ... lies in their ability to be formal, to exclude
from consideration in the particular case factors whose exclusion was determined
without reference to the particular case at hand."); see, e.g., Hadley, 526 F.3d at 1330
(whether the officer believed in good faith that he was in danger); see also Davis v.
City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (denying immunity because
"any reasonable officer in Officer Miller's position would have known . . . that
swinging a handcuffed man into a wall head-first multiple times and then punching
him in the face while he lay face-down on the ground, and breaking his neck as a
result, was unnecessary and excessive").
An earlier case also manifests a reluctance to characterize the "compliant
arrestee" norm as a rule, even while giving it rule-like effect. See Priester v. City of
Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919,923-24 (11 th Cir. 2000). That case involved an officer
who, according to the plaintiff, ordered a dog to attack him even though he had
complied with the officer's order. Id. at 923. That court ruled that "[o]n Plaintiffs
version of the facts a reasonable jury could conclude that Wheeler used an objectively
unreasonable amount of force." Id. at 924. The implication of Priester's language is
that the jury, assessing all the circumstances, could reasonably find either for or
against the plaintiff. See id. Yet the court goes on to rule that, on the plaintiff's facts,
"the law was clearly established ... that what Defendant Wheeler did violated
Plaintiff's constitutional rights." Id. at 927. The implication of this holding is that
there was a rule in place at the time Wheeler (by hypothesis) ordered the dog to attack,
and that the rule prohibited using such force against a compliant arrestee.
174. Hadley, 526 F.3d at 1333; see also Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc.,
380 F.3d 893, 901-03 (6th Cir. 2004). On the substantive Fourth Amendment issue
the court said "[t]o take the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs is to assume
that the Officers lay on top of Champion, a mentally retarded individual who had
stopped resisting arrest and posed no flight risk, and sprayed him with pepper spray
even after he was immobilized by handcuffs and a hobbling device. The use of such
force is not objectively reasonable." Id. at 901. On the qualified immunity issue, the
court found that it was "clearly established that the Officers' use of pepper spray
against Champion after he was handcuffed and hobbled was excessive." Id. at 903.
175. Id. at 1334.
Fall 2009]
THE RE VIEW OF LITIGATION
rule that officers may not "strik[e] [the plaintiff] 33 times without
giving him a chance to comply with their orders"176; Floyd v. City of
Detroit, applying a rule that "[a]s a matter of law, an unarmed and
nondangerous suspect has a constitutional right not to be shot by police
officers"' 7 7 ; and York v. City ofLas Cruces, applying a free speech rule
that "[a]lthough the word 'bitch' may be offensive to some, any
reasonable police officer should have known that he could not arrest
Mr. York for loudly saying this word" to no one in particular.' 78 Of
course, not all rules will favor plaintiffs. Zivojinovich v. Barner holds
that a small amount of force may be used against someone whose
disobedience consists merely of"disobey[ing] a command by members
of law enforcement to sit while they executed their lawful duties.'
179
Similarly, Freeman v. Gore laid down a rule that "minor, incidental
injuries that occur in connection with the use of handcuffs to effectuate
an arrest do not give rise to a constitutional claim for excessive
force."',
80
A crucial feature of these cases is that the opinions do not
canvas all the facts and circumstances in the manner invited by the
flexible test of Graham. Instead, courts hone in on a set of relatively
few features that recur from one case to another. Whether or not courts
self-consciously set about making rules, the effect of emphasizing the
arrestee's noncompliance or the officer's gratuitous use of force is to
transform the doctrine from a multifactor test to a body of rules.
Moreover, in each of the cases, the plaintiff won the denial of official
immunity, which signifies that the rule is already clearly established.
The overall impact of the rule making project is to enhance the efficacy
of § 1983 litigation in vindicating constitutional rights and deterring
176. 521 F.3d 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Baker v. City of Hamilton, 471
F.3d 601, 607 (6th Cir. 2006) ("We have held repeatedly that the use of force after a
suspect has been incapacitated or neutralized is excessive as a matter of law.").
177. 518 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Clem v. Corbeau, 384 F.3d
543, 554 (4th Cir. 2002) ("Well before 1998 it was clearly established that a police
officer could not lawfully shoot a citizen perceived to be unarmed and non-dangerous,
neither suspected of any crime nor fleeing a crime scene.").
178. 523 F.3d 1205, 1212 (10th Cir. 2008).
179. 525 F.3d 1059, 1072 (11 th Cir. 2008). The court also stated that "using an
uncomfortable hold to escort an uncooperative and potentially belligerent suspect is
not unreasonable." Id. (citing Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1345 (1 1th Cir.
2002)).
180. 483 F.3d 404, 417 (5th Cir. 2007).
102 [Vol. 29:1
JURY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
violations. My point is not that the rules will, or should, necessarily
favor plaintiffs. Plaintiffs will win some and lose some. The value of
rules can be appreciated only by comparing the "rules" model of
excessive-force law with one that persists in applying a multifactor
"totality of the circumstances" test like that of Graham. Under the
latter approach, plaintiffs are systematically thwarted by official
immunity, no matter how strong their cases are on the constitutional
merits. Under a rules-oriented doctrine, they still lose (as in Scott itself)
when the rules are against them. But now plaintiffs succeed in a
significant range of cases, as the rules are on their side and they are
unimpeded by qualified immunity.
The aims of § 1983 would be furthered to the extent that courts
seize every opportunity presented to them to state the law in the form of
rules. To take a recent example of a missed opportunity, in Dorsey v.
Barber, the Sixth Circuit ruled that an officer used excessive force
when he "ordered [plaintiffs] to the ground at gunpoint and held them
there despite their unsuspicious, nonthreatening behavior."'' 81 The
Court, however, also held that the officer was immune from paying
damages because the right was not "clearly established in a
particularized sense."' 182 In reaching these conclusions, the court
followed Graham's "facts and circumstances" test and framed its
Fourth Amendment holding as an assessment of the specific facts of
this incident. 83 For the sake of avoiding the qualified immunity
problem going forward, what the court should have also done is to
announce a rule to the effect that an officer violates the Fourth
Amendment when he orders a person to the ground at gunpoint and
holds him there despite his unsuspicious, non-threatening behavior. 184
The need for a jury trial on issues of historical fact does not
undermine the case for rules. As in any other area of law, the rules can
181. 517 F.3d 389, 401-02 (6th Cir. 2008).
182. Id. at 402.
183. Id. at 399-400.
184. See, e.g., Cruz v. City of Laramie, 239 F.3d 1183, 1188-90 (10th Cir.
2001). In that case, police officers had hog-tied a severely intoxicated, naked man,
binding his wrists and ankles together behind his back with 12 inches or less of
separation. Id. at 1186. This led to his death. Id. The court first announced a rule
that, going forward, "officers may not apply this technique when an individual's
diminished capacity is apparent." Id. at 1188. In the case at hand, however, official
immunity was appropriate because the rule had not been clearly established until now.
Id. at 1189-90.
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be molded into instructions so that juries know how the rules would
apply to their findings of fact. 85  The case law furnishes many
examples of this process. In Sample v. Bailey, Bailey, a police officer,
shot Sample, an unarmed burglar. 8 6 He claimed that Sample was
reaching into his jacket and might have been grabbing a weapon.18 7
Sample acknowledged that he moved his arm but denied that he moved
it toward his jacket.188 While a trial would be necessary in order to
resolve the factual dispute, the court made it clear that in the event the
jury believed Sample, Bailey would be liable. 189 Prior cases had moved
well beyond Graham's "totality of the circumstances" test, by
identifying precisely when deadly force would be appropriate.
190
Officers may use deadly force (such as firing a gun) "when the factual
situation revealed a perceived serious threat of physical harm to the
officer or others in the area from the perspective of a reasonable
officer."' 191 On Sample's facts, "Sample's mere action of moving his
arm to grab the top of the cabinet would not cause a reasonable officer
to perceive a serious threat of physical harm to himself or others."'
192
Moreover, the rule was clearly established and, in true rule-like fashion,
185. See Struve, supra note (providing a general introduction to crafting jury
instructions in constitutional cases). Even though Professor Struve would allocate
more decision making to the jury than I believe is wise, her analysis of the problems
that arise in translating constitutional doctrine into jury instructions is relevant no
matter how broad or narrow the jury's role may be. Another approach is to use the
special verdict, FED. R. Crv. P. 59, asking the juries for answers to specific issues of
fact so that the judge can then apply the legal rules. See Saman v. Robbins, 173 F.3d
1150, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding a special verdict in an excessive force
case); see generally Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, andAccountability in the
Litigation Process-The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U, CIN. L. REV. 15, 19 (1990)
(discussing the special verdict practice). Professor Brodin argues for greater use of
the special verdict in all areas of litigation: "The special verdict.., can serve to focus
the jurors' attention on the critical fact issues in dispute .... At the same time, the
device dispenses with the necessity for elaborate instructions on legal doctrine and,
consequently, minimizes our dependence on the ability and willingness of lay persons
to follow such instructions." Id.
186. 409 F.3d 689, 692 (6th Cir. 2005).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 693-94.
189. Id. at 695.
190. See id. at 697 (discussing the principles of Graham and delineating the
"rare instances" an officer may use deadly force).
191. Id.
192. Id.
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was not dependent upon the circumstances of particular cases. 193 If the
jury believed Sample, immunity would not be available to Bailey.
V. SCOTT AND RULE-BASED DECISION MAKING
Cases like Hadley and Sample show how courts can further the
aims of § 1983 by laying down rules. One explanation for the
reluctance of some lower courts to follow their example maybe simple
fidelity to Graham. 194 It is unclear whether their approach will change
after Scott because, viewed from the perspective of having to choose
between rules and standards, the majority opinion in Scott sends mixed
signals.' 95 Some elements of Scott seem to support Graham. Justice
Scalia explicitly declines' 96 to follow Tennessee v. Garner, an earlier,
pre-Graham case in which the Court had announced a rule that a police
office may not use deadly force unless the suspect poses a danger to
others. 197 Harris attempted to persuade the Court to apply Garner to
high-speed chases, arguing that his driving did not endanger others and
Scott's ramming could not be justified. 198 But that argument was
undercut by the eight-Justice majority's reaction to the video. Instead,
the Court found Garner inapposite, cited Graham with approval, and
reiterated Graham's directive that in order to decide the excessive-force
issue, "we must.., slosh our way through the factbound morass of
'reasonableness."" 9 9
Up to this point Justice Scalia's opinion seems quite unfriendly
to the notion that excessive-force doctrine should be stated in the form
of rules. Still, some of the reasoning in Scott provides grounds for hope
193. Id. at 698-701.
194. See, e.g., Estate of Larsen ex rel. Sturdivan v. Murr, 511 F.3d 1255, 1262
(10th Cir. 2008) (drawing an inference that it should "employ no bright line rules" in
excessive-force cases).
195. See supra Part II.A.
196. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382-83 (2007).
197. 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985); see supra notes -81 and accompanying text.
198. Scott, 550 U.S. at 381-82.
199. Id. at 386. By diminishing the authority of Garner in deadly force cases,
the Court cast substantial doubt on jury instructions aimed at applying the rule
announced in that case. See Blum, supra note, at 70-76 (discussing implications for
Garner "deadly force" instructions). In this way Scott may actually have diminished
the degree to which excessive-force law consists of rules, at least until the Court clears
up the confusion the opinion seems to have produced.
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that the Court may undertake more rule-making, abandoning Graham's
directive to examine "the facts and circumstances of each particular
case." In its penultimate paragraph, the opinion takes a sharp turn away
from Graham. Justice Scalia does not explicitly question the Graham
approach and certainly offers no praise for Garner. But, quite abruptly,
the vocabulary of rules reappears and this time in a somewhat more
favorable light. Sweeping away the contextual features that may bear
on Fourth Amendment reasonableness in a given case, Justice Scalia
concluded by rejecting Harris's proposed "rule requiring the police to
allow fleeing suspects to get away., 200 He chose instead to "lay down a
more sensible rule: A police officer's attempt to terminate a dangerous
high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does
not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing
motorist at risk of serious injury or death." 20 1
It is too soon to draw conclusions about just what the Court
intends by setting forth this proposition. The reference to a "rule" may
be nothing more than a shorthand summary of the discussion of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness that immediately preceded it.2°2 But
Justice Scalia may mean just what he says. The holding may be that,
going forward, excessive-force cases seeking damages for high-speed
chase cases must all be decided for the police officer, at least so long as
the chase "threatens the lives of innocent bystanders. 20 3 In view of the
majority's assessment of the video evidence in Scott, virtually all high-
speed chases in populated areas will satisfy this requirement. Under
this reading of the final paragraph, neither judge nor jury would
undertake case-by-case reasonableness calculations.
Perhaps some of the Justices feared that this is indeed the
significance Justice Scalia and others will give the last paragraph of the
opinion in future cases. Though Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined
the Court's opinion, they wrote separately to distance themselves from
the notion of adopting a general rule for high-speed chase cases. Justice
Ginsburg declined to read the case "as articulating a mechanical per se
rule," stressed that the inquiry "is situation specific," and identified
200. Id. at 385.
201. Id. at 386.
202. As one commentator has pointed out, this passage "is internally
inconsistent with the factual inquiry and balancing of interests undertaken earlier in
the majority's opinion." Leading Cases, supra note , at 220.
203. Scott, 550 U.S. at 386.
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factors-whether lives were at risk and whether a safer alternative was
available to the officer-bearing on its resolution.2 °4 Similarly, Justice
Breyer noted "the highly fact-dependent nature of this constitutional
determination,' 2 5 and explicitly "disagree[d] with the Court insofar as
it articulates aper se rule." 20 6 These disclaimers may well tell us much
about where the majority of the Court is going in this area of law. Six
Justices, after all, joined the Scalia opinion without issuing such
separate concurrences. The inference is highly plausible that these
Justices do prefer the rule-orientedness suggested by the final passages
of Justice Scalia's opinion.
V. OBJECTIONS TO RULE-BASED DECISION MAKING IN SECTION
1983 LITIGATION
It is easy to understand why Justices Ginsburg and Breyer would
prefer to leave open the constitutional validity of future high-speed
pursuits. On a different set of facts-for example, if the chase occurred
only in a remote area or at a much lower rate of speed-the officer's
actions may seem less reasonable than in Scott. One basic objection to
stating the law in the form of rules and then applying them rigorously is
that laudable goals must be sacrificed. An ineluctable result of picking
out a few features of a case and ignoring all the others is that a decision
maker simply cannot obtain the optimal result on the merits. 207 But
these Justices, and others who recoil at the notion that constitutional
law should be reduced to a body of rules, may fairly be accused of
seeking an unattainable ideal of perfect justice. Their implicit premise
seems to be that the aim of § 1983 litigation is to arrive at the very best
answer to the constitutional issue presented in each individual case.
When one conceives of § 1983 as a tool for vindicating rights and
deterring violations across a range of cases, the quest for constitutional
idealism becomes less alluring. The arbitrariness of rules is a cost that
204. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 387.
206. Id. at 389 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Kahan et al., supra note , at
856-57 & nn.73-79 (discussing the ambiguity of Scott on this point).
207. See Schauer, supra note , at 100 ("[A] system committed to rule-based
decision making attains the benefits brought by rules only by relinquishing its
aspirations for ideal decision making.").
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must be candidly acknowledged, but it also must be accepted.
A second objection centers on minimizing the role played by
qualified immunity. Since that doctrine simply does not permit the
systematic vindication of constitutional rights and deterrence of
violations under a case-by-case approach, one may attempt to find ways
around it, thereby avoiding rules and the costs of rule-based
adjudication. The problem is that under the current § 1983 regime it is
impossible to avoid qualified immunity in most cases seeking damages.
Immunity is unavailable only in suits where municipal governments can
be held liable, and these may be too few to permit effective vindication
and deterrence. In the future this problem of "over-immunity" might be
remedied through judicial or legislative action. Until such action is
taken, however, the only solution is to state constitutional doctrine in
the form of rules that minimize the role of official immunity.
A. The Cost of Rules: Arbitrary Line
In constitutional torts as in any other area, the advantage of
"totality of the circumstances" adjudication is that the decision maker
can take account of all relevant information. 20 8 A rule by its nature
excludes consideration of some factors that bear on the ideal outcome
in each individual case, for the sake of achieving stability and
predictability. 2°9 If the Court in Scott indeed made a rule to the effect
that officers are never liable for high-speed chases, cases will surely
arise in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer are proven right: The facts
seem to call for liability, yet the rule precludes it. 210 In Abney v. Coe, a
police chase case decided after Scott, Abney, a motorcyclist, died in a
208. See Kahan, et al., supra note , at 889-90 & nn.158-61 (discussing the
value of case-by-case decision-making); Kathleen Sullivan, Forward. The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HAgv. L. REv. 24, 58-59 (1992) (discussing the advantages
of standards over rules).
209. See Schauer, supra note, at 536-37 ("Rules get in the way. They exclude
from consideration factors that a decisionmaker unconstrained by those rules would
take into account.").
210. See Blum, supra note, at 62 (stating that if Scott indeed states a rule, that
rule "invites irresponsible, if not reckless, behavior on behalf of law enforcement
officers"); Leading Cases, supra note , at 220-21 (arguing that the Scott rule "is
flawed, as it ignores several factors relevant to determining the reasonableness of a
seizure-most glaringly, the opportunity for police to use alternate and non-life-
threatening methods to terminate the pursuit").
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collision with a sheriff deputy's car following an eight-mile pursuit.2 11
The deputy, Rodney Coe, had "observed [Abney] crossing double
yellow lines while passing a vehicle on a curve." 212 Coe tuned on his
blue lights and tried to pull Abney over.213 Abney fled and Coe gave
chase. 2 14 Eventually, under the plaintiffs version of the facts, "Coe
intentionally rammed the rear of Abney's motorcycle," resulting in
Abney's death.215 The Fourth Circuit relied on Scott in reversing the
district court's denial of summary judgment for Coe. 2 16 Possible
distinctions between the two cases were unimportant:
The fact that, unlike Scott, Abney did not accelerate to
85 miles per hour is not dispositive; indeed, the narrow,
winding, two-lane roads in this case all but prohibited
such speeds. The fact that Abney was driving during
the day and Harris 'in the dead of night' means only that
Abney had the opportunity to scare more motorists to
death. Similarly, the fact that Abney was driving a
motorcycle, rather than a car, does not require a
different result since the probability that a motorist will
be harmed by a Precision Intervention Technique is high
in either circumstance.
217
It is unclear whether the Fourth Circuit panel treats Scott as a
rule that decides the winner, but the result in Abney is consistent with
that reading of the case.21 8  By contrast, under a "totality of the
circumstances" approach, the reasonableness of the deputy's actions
may well turn on whether the vehicle being pursued is a car or a
motorcycle and on whether the driver is speeding.219
211. 493 F.3d 412, 413 (4th Cir. 2007).
212. Id. at 414.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at415.
216. Id. at413-14.
217. Id. at 418 (citation omitted).
218. See Blum, supra note, at 63-64 (arguing that Abney treats Scott as a per se
rule).
219. The "arbitrariness" of rules, may, in a given case, work to the disadvantage
not only of the plaintiff, as in Abney, but of the defendant as well. Lower courts have
generally held that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment when he uses force
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The issue raised by treating Scott as a rule is whether the benefit
of a rule is worth the cost of foregoing the "totality of the
circumstances" evaluation used in cases like Abney.220  The
constitutional tort-common law analogy is relevant to the resolution of
this issue, but it is not dispositive. Long ago, the rules-versus-
standards issue in negligence law was decided in favor of standards,
because it was thought that rules draw arbitrary lines. 221 But a more
precise and nuanced way of stating the outcome of that debate would
frame it in terms of the relative advantages of the two alternatives.
against an arrestee who has been subdued and who is passive. See, e.g., Hadley v.
Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11 th Cir. 2008) (holding that officer used excessive
force when he struck defendant without provocation or resistance). Part of the price of
implementing this rule is that an officer who in good faith believes he is in danger
from such a person nonetheless will be held liable. Id.
In contrast to Hadley, an earlier Eleventh Circuit case seems to rule that officers
are permitted to use force against an arrestee who has become compliant. In Garrett
v. Athens-Clarke County, 378 F.3d 1274 (1 1th Cir. 2004), officers had, with much
effort, subdued Eric Irby. Id. at 1278. They then tied his wrists and ankles together,
"causing his body to be bowed." Id. Irby died minutes later. Id. Rejecting his
estate's argument that the force was excessive because the officers "fettered him after
he was made compliant," the court said that in the circumstances, the officers were
entitled to "restrain Irby in such a way that he could not harm another officer or
himself should he decide to stop being compliant, a realistic possibility given his
recent words and deeds." Id. at 1280-8 1.
Hadley and Garrett can be distinguished on their facts. Irby fought for some
time before being subdued, Garrett, 378 F.3d at 1277-78, while, according to the
plaintiffs facts, Hadley did not, Hadley, 526 F.3d at 1327-28. But in a regime of
rules, that factual distinction may have to be suppressed. The two cases illustrate the
dilemma that courts face when they are asked to state the law in the form of rules. On
the one hand, making a blunt rule that force may not be used against compliant
suspects would cast doubt on Garrett. On the other, attempting to diminish the
arbitrariness by allowing the officers to escape liability in the case where they can
show reasons to believe they were still in danger sacrifices the clarity that rules
provide.
220. See also Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11 th Cir. 2007).
Beshers was another post-Scott case raising this cost-benefit issue. It dealt with a
high-speed chase of someone suspected of attempting to steal beer, a chase which
ended with the patrol car ramming the suspect's car and resulted in the suspect's
death. Id. at 1262-63. The court, relying on Scott, held that there was no Fourth
Amendment violation. Id. at 1268. For further discussion of Beshers, see Blum,
supra note , at 64-66.
221. See Francesco Parisi, Rules Versus Standards, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC CHOICE 510, 515 (2003) (discussing a history of the rules versus standards
issue).
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What courts actually concluded is that the costs of rules were too high
to justify their benefits.
The most famous example from common law torts concerns the
Goodman/Pokora episode. In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Goodman,
a truck collided with a train at a railroad crossing; the plaintiff won a
jury verdict, and the railroad appealed, claiming that it should have
been granted a directed verdict on account of the plaintiffs fault.222
The issue for the Supreme Court was whether the driver's failure to
stop and get out of the car to look for trains amounted to contributory
negligence as a matter of law.223 With Justice Holmes writing the
opinion, the Court ruled that "if a driver cannot be sure otherwise
whether a train is dangerously near he must stop and get out of his
vehicle. 224 Holmes emphasized that the holding went beyond the facts
of the case-though "the question of due care very generally is left to
the jury.., when the standard is clear it should be laid down once and
for all by the Courts."
225
Many first-year law students read Goodman, and then they read
Pokora v. Wabash Railway,226 where, less than seven years later, the
Court abandoned Holmes's approach. That case, too, involved a
railway crossing accident.227 Again, the plaintiff had failed to get out of
his truck.228 On the authority of Goodman, the defendant won below.229
With Justice Cardozo writing the opinion, the Supreme Court
reversed.23 ° Cardozo reasoned that "[t]o get out of a vehicle and
reconnoiter is an uncommon precaution,.... it is very likely to be futile,
222. 275 U.S. 66, 69 (1927).
223. Id. at 69-70.
224. Id. at 70.
225. Id. Many years earlier, Holmes had advanced the notion that the
"featureless generality" of the "prudent man" standard "ought to be continually giving
place to the specific one, that he was bound to use this or that precaution under these
or those circumstances." HOLMES, supra note, at 89. For Holmes, this was not just a
matter of doctrinal tidiness. His rationale was that "[w]hen a man has to pay damages,
he is supposed to have broken the law, and he is further supposed to have known what
the law was." Id. Accordingly, "any legal standard must, in theory, be capable of
being known." Id.
226. 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
227. Id. at 99.
228. Id. at 101.
229. Id. at 99.
230. Id. at 106.
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and sometimes even dangerous., 23' After enumerating the dangers that
may arise in one set of circumstances or another, the opinion concluded:
Illustrations such as these bear witness to the
need for caution in framing standards of behavior that
amount to rules of law. The need is the more urgent
when there is no background of experience out of which
the standards have emerged. They are then not the
natural flowerings of behavior in its customary forms,
but rules artificially developed, and imposed from
without.232
Because Goodman had "been a source of confusion in the
federal courts," and "had only wavering support in the courts of the
states," the Court effectively abandoned the rule-based approach of the
233
earlier case. The Goodman/Pokora episode is widely understood as a
cautionary tale about overreaching by judges in negligence law.234 The
Third Restatement of Torts notes that "[b]y and large, .. . American
courts have decided that the advantages of allowing courts to decide the
negligence issue in cases [where reasonable persons may reach diverse
outcomes] do not justify removing the issue from the jury.' 235 Echoing
Cardozo, the Restatement observes that seemingly similar cases may
present "many variables that can best be considered on a case-by-case
basis. 236
As with many other attempted analogies between constitutional
and common law torts, this one does not hold up to scrutiny. It may
well be that case-by-case adjudication rightly won the day in common
law torts, though there are still some dissenters.237 But it is a mistake to
231. Id. at 104.
232. Id. at 105.
233. Id. at 106.
234. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 8,
reporter's note c (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) ("Pokora is correctly interpreted as
rebuking Holmes and his approach in Goodman and as favoring instead an
individualization of assessments of parties' negligence.").
235. Id. at cmt. c.
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept:
Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 468 (1976) (arguing that "relatively
specific rules of decision" are necessary for "the integrity of the judicial process").
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transplant that judgment into § 1983 litigation. Because of the special
factor of official immunity, the comparison of costs and benefits comes
out differently in constitutional torts. Arbitrariness that seems too
burdensome in the common law can be tolerated when the alternative is
thwarting the basic aims of the cause of action.
A further point regarding the cost of rules should be noted: It is
larger or smaller depending on just how broadly the rule is stated.
Narrow rules have fewer arbitrariness costs than broader ones, while at
the same time they avoid the bad effects of qualified immunity. For
example, the putative Scott rule need not and should not apply on the
facts of Adams v. Speers.238 In this pre-Scott case, a high-speed chase
ended with both the driver and the officer off the road.239 The officer
then shot the driver without provocation, and the court found a Fourth
Amendment violation.240 Scott does not require any reconsideration of
that outcome, as there is no difficulty at all in tailoring the high-speed
chase rule so as to limit it to the harms done during the chase itself.
The general principle illustrated by this example is that the criteria for
making constitutional tort law need not include any requirement that
rules have any particular breadth. In order to overcome official
immunity, all that is needed is that courts state rules. Narrow rules are
as good as broad ones for this purpose. Recall Abney, which involved
the high-speed chase of a motorcyclist.24' The benefits of rules would
be fully achieved by distinguishing that case from Scott simply based on
the type of vehicle, limiting the (hypothesized) Scott rule to cars and
trucks, while making a rule forbidding high-speed chases of
motorcycles .242
B. Exceptions to Official Immunity
The case for rules rests on the problems generated by official
immunity for a standards-based body of law. To the extent immunity
238. 473 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2007).
239. Id. at 991.
240. Id. at 992.
241. Abney v. Coe, 493 F.3d 412, 413 (4th Cir. 2007).
242. To take another example, the Scott rule could be limited to ramming
vehicles of persons who endanger others by extremely fast driving, and not extended,
as it was in Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1268 (11 th Cir. 2007), to someone
whose supposed dangerousness is established, in part, by the officer's reasonable
belief that he was "driving under the influence of alcohol."
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can be avoided, that case is weaker. In two types of § 1983 cases,
official immunity will not prevent recovery, and the regime of standards
is correspondingly more attractive. But the problem remains because
these theories of recovery are rarely available in excessive-force cases.
First, if the plaintiff is able to establish the grounds for
prospective relief, such as an injunction forbidding the illegal practice,
immunity will not be an obstacle. The difficulty here is that in
excessive-force cases those requirements are hard to meet. In
particular, the plaintiff has to show a likelihood that he will be
subjected to illegal force in the future. In City ofLos Angeles v. Lyons,
a police officer stopped the plaintiff for a traffic violation and then,
according to the complaint, "without provocation or justification, seized
Lyons and applied a chokehold ... rendering him unconscious and
causing damage to his larynx. 243 In his § 1983 suit, Lyons sought not
only damages but also an injunction forbidding the practice in the
future. 24 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether he had
standing to seek injunctive relief, which "depended on whether he was
likely to suffer future injury from the use of the chokeholds by police
officers., 245 Finding that Lyons had not made a credible allegation to
that effect, the Court dismissed the claim for prospective relief.
246
Lyons severely limited the availability of injunctions in excessive-force
cases, as few plaintiffs will meet the Court's requirements.
247
Second, local governments may be sued under § 1983, and they
243. 461 U.S. 95, 97-98 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
244. Id. at 98.
245. Id. at 105.
246. Id. at 124-25.
247. See, e.g., Wilson v. Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 342 (6th Cir. 2007) (declining
to enjoin the county "from authorizing investigative detentions, [i.e.], detentions based
on less than probable cause for 48 to 72 hours" on the ground that "none of the
plaintiffs can establish that it is reasonably likely that they will encounter the police
again"); Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 2004) (declining to grant
prospective relief because "Shain has not established--or even alleged before this
appeal-the likelihood of a future encounter with the Nassau County Police likely to
result in a subsequent unconstitutional strip search"). Note that some other types of
Fourth Amendment violations may have greater success. See City of Houston v. Hill,
482 U.S. 451, 459 n.7 (1987) (finding that "Hill's record of [four] arrests under the
ordinance lends compelling support to the threat of future enforcement" sufficient to
give Hill standing to challenge the validity of the statute); Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 355 n.3 (1983) (holding that a person who had been stopped fifteen times
under a state law had standing to seek prospective relief).
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do not enjoy any immunity whatsoever, even in suits for damages. 248
Here, the problem for the plaintiff is that local governments are not
liable for the constitutional torts of their employees on a respondeat
superior basis.249 They are liable only for constitutional violations that
result from their "official polices" or "customs." 250 In order to win on
the "policy" prong of this test, one must show that (a) the relevant
governing body has enacted an unconstitutional rule, (b) a "final
policymaker" for the local government made an unconstitutional
decision, or (c) bad training and hiring decisions by the local
government produced constitutional violations by low level officers.2
A "custom" is a widespread unconstitutional practice by low level
officers that higher-ups ignore.25 2 And there is another requirement:
"The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate
conduct, the municipality was the 'moving force' behind the injury
alleged., 253 In the excessive-force context, all of the tests are hard to
meet, so much so that none can be relied upon for relief. Excessive-
force cases typically arise when an officer under stress reacts with what
may, in retrospect, be viewed as too much force. There are very few
cases involving written policies that authorize excessive force, or policy
making officials who direct or approve the use of excessive force,254 or
widespread practices by street-level officers that higher-ups know or
should know about. 255 Inadequate training or inadequate screening of
248. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980) (rejecting
qualified immunity for municipalities).
249. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
250. Id. at 694.
251. See SHELDON NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 275-331 (2d ed.
2004) (discussing these theories of recovery against municipalities).
252. See, e.g., Baron v. Suffolk County Sheriffs Dep't, 402 F.3d 225,229 (1st
Cir. 2005) (upholding a verdict imposing liability on a municipality for corrections
officers' practice of harassing an officer who reported a fellow officer's misconduct).
253. Bd. of Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,404 (1997).
254. Such cases do come up from time to time. This may be the rationale behind
the rejection of the city's motion for summary judgment in Cruz v. City ofLaramie,
239 F.3d 1183, 1191 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that high ranking officials were aware
of positional asphyxia attributable to hog-tie restraints). Note, however, that the court
seems to treat this as a failure-to-train case. Id.
255. The "custom" theory succeeded in Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d
1220, 1227 (5th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 739 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (affirming a
jury verdict against the city, where the plaintiff established that police officers
frequently used "throw down" guns, putting them near unarmed persons who had been
shot by police officers, so as to justify the shooting).
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new hires are more promising theories, but here too the Court has
placed significant hurdles in the way of recovery: in order to win a
training case, a plaintiff must show that the training of the officer was
so carelessly done as to show "deliberate indifference" to the
constitutional rights of persons with whom the officer has contact. 6
Typically, plaintiffs pursue two or more of these theories at once, but in
practice it has proven difficult, though not impossible, for the plaintiff
to prevail on any of them. 7
The difficulties of winning on an "inadequate screening" theory
are illustrated by Board of Commissioners ofBryan County v. Brown.258
The plaintiff claimed that Reserve Deputy Stacy Bums used excessive
force in the course of a traffic stop, and the plaintiff sued the county on
the theory that it should not have hired Bums on account of his pre-
employment criminal record, which included guilty pleas to
misdemeanor charges of assault and battery, resisting arrest, and public
drunkenness.2 5 9 The Court held that such a claim could succeed only if
the hiring decision "reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a
violation of a particular constitutional.. . right will follow the
decision., 260 Thus, "the mere probability that any officer inadequately
screened will inflict any constitutional injury" is not sufficient.26'
Liability "must depend on a finding that this officer was highly likely to
inflict the particular injury suffered by the plaintiff., 262
Professor Amar recognizes that official immunity is a problem
for his "strong jury" thesis and proposes to deal with it by lifting the
limits on municipal liability and moving toward respondeat superior.
263
256. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
257. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 561 (6th Cir. 2008)
(upholding the complaint in an excessive-force case); Smith v. Watkins, 159 F.3d
1137, 1138-39 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting plaintiff's "municipal liability theories");
Myers v. Oklahoma County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1318-20 (10th
Cir. 1998) (rejecting plaintiffs municipal liability theories); Matthews v. Jones, 35
F.3d 1046, 1049-50 (6th Cir. 1994) (rejecting plaintiff's municipal liability theories);
Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1480-83 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding jury
verdict against the municipality on failure to train and ruling that the city's inadequate
training established liability as a matter of law).
258. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
259. Id. at 400-01.
260. Id. at 411.
261. Id. at 412.
262. Id.
263. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
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Doing so would require either that the Supreme Court overrule Monell
or that Congress nullify that case by amending § 1983. This proposal to
enhance the strength of the case for the jury by altering the background
principles of current law simply sidesteps the issues explored in this
article. However strong the case may be for entity liability, 264 there is
no escape from the need to address current issues against the
background of current law. A pragmatic approach to specific § 1983
issues, including the judge-jury question considered here, is best-served
by taking the Court's entrenched doctrine as a starting point. So long as
the official immunity principle remains in place, the best way to
promote constitutional values through § 1983 suits for damages is to
formulate the law as a body of rules, insofar as this is possible. In this
regard, it is helpful to distinguish between two dimensions of Scott-
the substantive choice in favor of law enforcement, and (what seems to
be) a decision to embody that choice in the form of a rule. Good
arguments can be made against the Court's substantive choice, but there
is also a strong case in favor of the Court's decision to make a rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have argued against jury discretion, and in favor of rule-based
decision making, in § 1983 cases that involve claims of unreasonable
force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The argument is a focused
one because it draws heavily on certain features of excessive-force
litigation."' In this context, an effective damages remedy is essential to
FIRST PRINCIPLES 40-41 (1997) (noting that the "shocking remedial gap" caused by
official immunity would be best closed by "recogniz[ing] direct liability of the
government entity.").
264. There is a large literature on the pros and cons of entity liability, most of it
focused on larger issues than the jury trial problem addressed in this article. Compare
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987)
(advancing arguments for entity liability), with John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the
Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REv. 47, 53-54, 68-81 (1998)
(arguing that "a constitutional tort regime based on fault is wise policy"); see also
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL., CiVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION
210-11 (2d ed. 2007) (citing several articles on the topic).
265. There are virtues to examining constitutional tort issues on a right-by-right
basis rather than attempting to come up with principles of general applicability. See
John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 259
(2000). Jeffries argues, convincingly in my view, that
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the vindication of constitutional rights because injunctive remedies are
rarely available and municipal liability is hard to establish. Qualified
immunity looms as an obstacle to recovery of damages unless the law is
clearly established. Juries cannot clearly establish the law. Onlyjudges
can do that, and then only by making rules.
This article does not take sides in the broad debate over the
value of the jury in general tort law. The case against a dominant role
for the jury in Fourth Amendment excessive-force litigation is not
based on any inherent defect in jury decision making. The problem
with juries is that juries cannot make rules, and rules are essential to
achieving the goals of § 1983 litigation in excessive-force cases. Even
where the standards of conduct are set by judges, as they generally are
in public employee speech litigation, rules are preferable to standards
on account of qualified immunity.
266
This is not a blanket preference for rules, nor a general
indictment of the jury in § 1983 litigation. In areas where the main
enforcement mechanisms are suits for injunctions, there is no qualified
immunity defense and the argument for rules may be less compelling.
2 67
These include-to take three prominent examples-litigation over
school segregation; voting rights; and time, manner, and place
restrictions on speech. The argument advanced here for rules is not
Treating the availability of damages [for constitutional violations] as a
transsubstantive exercise in statutory interpretation [of § 1983] obscures
important differences among rights and suppresses clear thinking about
remedies. A better strategy would.., adapt remedies to specific rights. The
availability of money damages would then depend on an assessment of their
role in enforcing particular rights-and especially on the availability of
alternative remedies that make damages more or less needful.
Id.
266. See Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, the First Amendment, and Public
Employee Speech: Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (and Vice Versa), 35 GA. L.
REv. 939, 975-79 (2001) (discussing qualified immunity problems in the public
employee speech context).
267. While my argument is a narrow one, there are good reasons to favor
Supreme Court opinions that give more guidance as to how officials should behave
across the whole range of cases the Court decides. See Frederick Schauer,
Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick, 2007 SuP. CT. REv. 205,
205-07 (arguing that while "the need for Supreme Court guidance of lower courts has
increased substantially over the past several decades ... its willingness to take on
these obligations has been heading in the opposite direction"). But one need not
endorse Professor Schauer's view in order to accept my thesis.
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even directed at the whole body of Fourth Amendment law, but only at
those parts of it that are litigated in § 1983 cases. By contrast, many
other areas of Fourth Amendment law are adjudicated in suppression
hearings or other settings where official immunity is not an issue. The
case for rules is weaker in those settings.268
Courts and scholars pay a great deal of attention to the
substantive choices that must be made in adjudicating constitutional
issues, and almost none to the question of form. Yet form and
substance are sometimes intertwined, at least in excessive-force cases.
The ultimate aim of § 1983 litigation is not to arrive at the perfect post
hoc balance of state and individual interests in every single case. It is to
vindicate constitutional rights and deter constitutional violations
without inhibiting effective government in the process, and to achieve
these aims in a systematic way over the long run. So long as Graham's
"totality of the circumstances" test governs excessive-force cases, the
combination of official immunity and restrictions on governmental
liability will systematically thwart the vindication and deterrence aims
of constitutional torts. Even when the plaintiff establishes a Fourth
Amendment violation, recovery will be hard to come by. Absent
modification of the official immunity or governmental liability
doctrines, the only realistic solution is to abandon Graham, and hence
to diminish the role of the jury, in favor of a regime of rules.
268. See Ronald J. Allen, Joseph L. Hoffman, Debra A. Livingston & William
J. Stuntz, COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 554 (2d ed. 2005) (noting
arguments against "bright-line Fourth Amendment rules").
Even in areas where the case for rules is comparatively weak, however, the need
for directives that can actually constrain official conduct favors a more, rather than
less, rule-like approach. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial
Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 857, 904 (1999) ("Constitutional doctrine, in order
to have any useful meaning in governing the primary behavior of government, must be
more rule-like than any of the most abstract standards that might be put forward as the
basic principle of any given constitutional right.").
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